## 1AC

### 1AC—Transition

#### CONTENTION 1 IS THE CUBAN TRANSITION:

#### Cuba’s current reforms are *slow*, *contradictory*, and *insufficient*—the plan is key

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\*This card is from pages 1,3, and 4 of the pdf. Page two contains a wholly different article. “Are Raúl Castro's Reforms Helping Cuba's Economy?” is published on pages 1, 3 and 4 of the PDF. Our evidence is the entirety of the article. We will provide you the PDF if you are curious\*

In late September, Cuba's government¶ announced the legalization¶ of 18 new categories of private¶ employment, including real¶ estate agents, bringing the total number of¶ approved types of independent employment¶ to 199. While Raúl Castro's government¶ has issued more than 430,000 private¶ employment licenses since 2010, the latest¶ employment legalization effort also¶ included bans on certain economic activities,¶ including the reselling of imported¶ goods. Are Cuba's newest economic¶ reforms likely to bear fruit? How much has¶ the state ceded control of the economy to¶ market forces in recent years? What surprises¶ might lie in store for Cuba's economy¶ and its business climate?¶ AMatthew Aho, consultant in the¶ corporate practice group of¶ Akerman Senterfitt in New York:¶ "The decision to legalize new categories¶ of private employment is yet¶ another incremental step that—combined¶ with other changes since 2010—clearly¶ indicates a shift away from total state control¶ and toward a 21st-century mixed market¶ economy. Other recent examples¶ include the September publication of new¶ rules governing foreign investment at the¶ Mariel Export Processing Zone and the¶ Oct. 9 decision to allow state tourism agencies¶ to do business with private enterprises,¶ such as bed and breakfasts and restaurants.¶ The Cuban state will remain the economy's¶ dominant player, but the space it has yielded¶ so far was inconceivable five years ago.¶ And it's paying off: visitors to Havana¶ report a never-before-seen economic¶ vibrancy transforming the urban landscape,¶ as black-market businesses leave the¶ shadows and new, remittance-fueled ventures¶ arise. What's more, the recent loosening¶ of migration restrictions and the passage¶ (likely in 2014) of new foreign investment¶ laws signal that policymakers are¶ preparing for infusions of foreign investment¶ and remittance capital in the medium-¶ to-long terms. There is a bevy of potential surprises, foreign and domestic.¶ At home, the recent ban on reselling¶ imported goods met swift and unusually¶ vocal opposition from entrepreneurs¶ vowing to disobey the rules. In the¶ months ahead, the government must¶ decide how to engage 430,000 private¶ economic actors (and those dependent¶ on them) as a rising political force on the¶ island. Abroad, President Obama will¶ decide whether to support the Cuban people in their pursuit of greater economic¶ self-determination through¶ proactive policies or do nothing—thereby¶ **clinging to decades of failed sanctions**—¶ because he sees no political¶ upside. 2014 could be a real tipping¶ point in U.S.–Cuba relations, but only if¶ both sides seize the moment. That,¶ unfortunately, would be the biggest surprise¶ of all."¶ ACollin Laverty, founder and¶ president of Cuba Educational¶ Travel: "Time will tell how far¶ and how fast the reforms go,¶ which will determine their economic,¶ political and social impact. Up until now,¶ the government has been very cautious—¶ prioritizing stability while also¶ making drastic changes within the context¶ of the last five decades of communist¶ rule. Legalizing small-scale enterprise,¶ expanding cooperatives and creating a¶ housing market are important steps,¶ affecting the psychology of Cubans and¶ how they see and operate in the market.¶ However, **these important reforms will**¶ **not result in significant improvements** in¶ the overall performance of the economy.¶ Larger, more controversial and difficult¶ reforms will need to be implemented in¶ order to fundamentally change the¶ makeup and output of the economy,¶ such as currency reform, increased foreign¶ investment, legalization of more¶ private enterprises, including those of¶ medium-scale, the organic creation of¶ cooperatives, an end to excessive subsidies¶ to inefficient state-owned enterprises¶ and increased access to telecommunications.¶ The government's decision in late September to expand private enterprise but simultaneously restrict the sale of imported goods shows contradictions¶ in the process. Official discourse is to¶ remove the state from non-essential¶ areas of the economy, but **the forces that be are unwilling to relinquish their monopoly** in the retail sector. A better¶ approach would be to remove luxury¶ taxes on goods sold at dollar stores and¶ focus on currency reform and economywide¶ pricing adjustments, which would¶ allow it to compete with the private sector.¶ Albeit slowly, the process continues¶ to be two steps forward, a half step backwards,¶ and demographics and economic¶ necessity should keep it that way."¶ AKirby Jones, president of¶ Alamar Associates in Arizona:¶ "The numbers speak for themselves:¶ the reforms in Cuba are¶ real, will continue and have already¶ changed the face of Cuba. If you had¶ asked me just a few years ago whether I¶ would expect what is going on in Cuba¶ today, I would say a resounding no. But¶ the reforms have already borne fruit.¶ The Batistianos like Rep. Ileana Ros-¶ Lehtinen and Sen. Robert Menendez can¶ question the reforms all they want, but¶ their criticisms do not change the reality¶ on the ground. And now we hear of pilot¶ projects with only one currency. Facts¶ speak for themselves. And through all of¶ this, the United States is on the outside¶ clinging to a policy rooted in the last¶ century. The Cuban government has¶ ceded some control on economic matters,¶ and true market forces are at work.¶ Is that not what the United States wants? These reforms are like toothpaste that¶ cannot be put back into the tube. There¶ will be problems as well as starts and¶ stops along the way. The United States¶ could be helping this process instead of¶ **trying to stop it**. Meanwhile Brazil,¶ China and many others are part of the¶ change, realize that it is real, are investing¶ in Cuba and are making money in¶ the process. The United States should do¶ the same." Carmelo Mesa-Lago, professor¶ emeritus of economics and¶ Latin American studies at the¶ University of Pittsburgh: "The¶ re-authorization/extension of selfemployment¶ is a key of Raúl's reform to¶ enlarge the private sector and dismiss 1.8¶ million workers unneeded in the state sector.¶ Currently, 22 percent of the labor¶ force is in the non-state sector. It should¶ jump to around 40 percent by 2015 and¶ account for a rising percentage of GDP.¶ But self-employment is obstructed by several¶ constraints: 1.) The large majority of¶ occupations are unskilled or require little¶ skills, whereas most of the state employees to be fired are professionals or skilled¶ workers. 2.) University graduates (badly¶ needed in the private sector, such as managers,¶ engineers and architects) can't practice as self-employed, hence they may¶ work as taxi drivers or food sellers but not¶ in their professions. 3.) Taxes are quite a burden. For instance, the tax rates on the¶ labor force gradually increase with the¶ number of employees hired, therefore¶ penalizing those self-employed that hire¶ more employees, which is a disincentive¶ for the self-employed and counterproductive¶ in the state quest to get rid of surplus¶ labor. 4.) The government sends contradictory signals, such as raids to shut down self-employed Cubans who have stands¶ under Havana porches, or the government¶ first taxes and then bans the sale of¶ imported goods. Currently the reforms are insufficient to solve the many economic and social problems accumulated under half a century of centralized, inefficient socialism. There is a wide consensus¶ inside and outside Cuba that they **must be deepened and accelerated** to accomplish¶ that task, but Raúl has little time left to do¶ so before he retires in 2018."¶ AArchibald Ritter, distinguished¶ research professor emeritus of¶ economics and international¶ affairs at Carleton University:¶ "Major changes have been implemented¶ already, and further reforms are in the¶ works or on the horizon. The reforms will¶ continue to orient economic policy and¶ lead to substantial improvements in the¶ Cuban economy and in citizens' living¶ standards. The market-oriented component¶ of the Cuban economy has expanded¶ and now includes about 27.5 percent¶ of the employed labor force. It will¶ expand dramatically if the pseudo-cooperative¶ state farms and non-agricultural¶ state enterprises become authentic cooperatives.¶ Registered micro-enterprises¶ now include 430,000 people, 8.6 percent¶ of the employed labor force. The marketoriented¶ joint foreign/state enterprises¶ employ about 1 percent of the labor¶ force. The market-oriented underground¶ economy provides full- or part-time first¶ or second jobs for maybe 10 percent of¶ the labor force. Under September 2012¶ legislation, the Unidades Básicas de¶ Producción Cooperativa should become¶ real cooperatives, increasing the mainly¶ private sector in agriculture to approximately¶ 11.6 percent of the labor force.¶ Non-agricultural cooperatives in time¶ should include most of the goods- and¶ services-producing state sector. They are¶ to be worker-managed and under the¶ forces of supply and demand. The new¶ Mariel Export Processing Zone may¶ attract major investments, especially¶ from China and Brazil, and provide a¶ strong market-propelled stimulus. The transformation of state enterprises into authentic market-oriented cooperatives would constitute a change and improvement of historic dimension. Cuba could¶ become a country of 'worker ownership¶ and management' and continue to be¶ unique in the world. In contrast to the¶ ideology-based policy impetuosity and¶ vacillation of President Fidel Castro over¶ 47 years, the approach of President Raúl¶ Castro has been cautious, gradual, pragmatic,¶ stable and 'evidence-based.' There¶ are downside risks. Bureaucratic footdragging¶ may slow the reforms. The 'special¶ relationship' with Venezuela may falter¶ with political change and changed¶ economic priorities in that country. But¶ the economic surprises are more likely to¶ be positive, and there may even be some¶ positive political surprises—I never cease¶ to hope. **A most welcome surprise would**¶ **be a normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations**¶ during the presidency of Barack Obama."

#### A *total repeal* of the embargo is critical to *provide foreign capital* and incentivize *liberalization and democracy*

CSG 13 – The Cuba Study Group is a non-profit and non-partisan organization studying Cuba. (“Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba”, February 2013, <http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032>)

Beyond failing to advance its stated objectives, the most counterproductive aspect of Helms-Burton is that it codifies U.S. embargo sanctions toward Cuba, and conditions the suspension of any and all such sanctions on congressional recognition of a transition government in Cuba. This is counterproductive in two ways. First, it hinders the United States’ ability to respond rapidly and strategically to developments on the Island as they occur. For example, if the Executive Branch wishes to increase assistance to the 400,000 private entrepreneurs currently operating small businesses in Cuba, it can only do so in a limited way through its licensing authority. Second, it creates a dynamic of “all-or-nothing” conditionality that effectively places U.S. policy in the hands of the Cuban government, making it easier for Cuban officials to resist political reform and dictate the degree of American influence on the Island. Defenders of the status quo inside the Cuban government have shown that they view greater engagement with the United States as a threat to their hold on power. As Elizardo Sanchez, the head of the Cuban Commission for Human Rights, has recognized: “The more American citizens in the streets of Cuban cities, the better for the cause of a more open society.” The Cuban government has become increasingly adept at manipulating U.S. policy choices. This is why any sign of a thaw from the United States has repeatedly been followed by confrontation or repression, which in turn has been followed by U.S. domestic pressure to tighten economic sanctions. This pattern has become somewhat predictable, as recently exemplified by Cuba’s imprisonment of U.S. contractor Alan Gross after President Obama relaxed family travel and remittance restrictions in 2009 and U.S. policymakers’ refusal to pursue improved bilateral relations in response.xvi It can be reasonably concluded that elements of the Cuban government do not, in fact, seek any substantial liberalization from U.S. sanctions. Indeed, Helms-Burton provides them with an alibi for their own failures and may well be essential to their political survival. Senator Jesse Helms famously said that Helms-Burton “tightened the noose around the neck of the last dictator in the Western Hemisphere, Fidel Castro.”xvii In practice, however, Helms-Burton may have served as an incredibly convenient life raft, giving a struggling and failing system the legitimacy that comes from the appearance of being a “state under siege.” Repealing Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions that limit the Executive Branch’s authority over Cuba policy. Over time, U.S. policies toward Communist countries with poor human rights records and histories of adversarial relations—such as China and Vietnam—have evolved toward diplomatic normalization and economic engagement. Policymakers in both parties have rightly judged that engagement, rather than isolation, better serves U.S. national interests and lends greater credibility to calls for political and economic reform. The Cuba Study Group believes the most effective way to break the deadlock of “all-or-nothing” conditionality and remedy the ineffectiveness of current U.S. policy is by de-codifying the embargo against Cuba through the repeal of Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions that limit the Executive Branch’s authority over Cuban policy.xviii Repealing Helm-Burton and related statutory provisions would shift the primary focus of U.S. Cuba policy away from the regime and toward empowering Cuban people. It would also enhance the leverage of the United States to promote a multilateral approach toward Cuba, as well as embolden reformers, democracy advocates and private entrepreneurs inside the island to press their government for greater change. De-codifying the embargo would allow the Executive Branch the flexibility to use the entire range of foreign policy tools at its disposal—diplomatic, economic, political, legal and cultural—to incentivize change in Cuba. The President would be free to adopt more efficient, targeted policies necessary for pressuring the Cuban leadership to respect human rights and implement political reforms, while simultaneously empowering all other sectors of society to pursue their economic wellbeing and become the authors of their own futures.xix Repealing Helms-Burton would also free civil society development and assistance programs to be implemented outside of a contentious sanctions framework. Repealing the extraterritorial provisions of Helms-Burton would allow the United States greater leverage in persuading the international community, especially key regional partners, to adopt a multilateral and targeted approach toward focusing on the advancement of human rights in Cuba. This would fundamentally transform the international dynamic that has long helped the Cuban government stifle dissent, since its efforts to isolate critics at home would increasingly lead to its own isolation from the international community. While it is difficult to prove a direct causal connection between economic reforms and an open society, modern history has taught us that it is increasingly difficult for dictatorial governments to maintain political control the more prosperity their people enjoy.xx Repealing Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions would allow the U.S. the ability to efficiently promote and provide direct support to Cuba’s private sector. Such support would empower a greater plurality within Cuban society, including government reformers, democracy advocates, Cuban entrepreneurs and society as a whole by increasing their access to the resources and expertise of the world’s most prosperous private sector (and largest Cuban diaspora), located a mere 90 miles from Cuba’s shores. In turn, this would enhance the relative power of Cuban society to that of the state, while stripping the latter of its preferred scapegoat for its oppressive practices and economic blunders. U.S. policy should also seek to incentivize the Cuban government to end state monopolies on economic activities and allow greater private participation in the economy. The Cuba Study Group believes that any forthcoming congressional review of current legislation relating to Cuba, such as a review of the Cuban Adjustment Act, must require a review of the totality of the legislative framework codified in HelmsBurton and related statutory provisions so that the United States may finally develop a coherent policy toward the Island. The U.S. should pursue this course of action independent of actions taken by the Cuban government so as not to place the reigns of U.S. policy in the hands of Cuban proponents of the status quo.

**More moderate approaches *comparatively fail* to stabilize Cuba**

Koenig 10 – Lance is a US Army Colonel. This is a paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War College. (“Time for a New Cuba Policy”, March 11, 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130)

The United States requires a policy that will lead to better relations between the United States and Cuba, increase the soft power of the United States in the Latin American world, and pull the Cuban government towards a more representative form of governance. These conditions will contribute to the national security of the United States as well as to the western hemisphere. So with this in mind, what are our likely options? Options

• Path of least resistance, stay the course. The United States can continue with the current policy of trade embargo, travel restrictions, and limited diplomatic relations. The United States will not likely choose this path, but will rather go down it because it is easier politically to not change the status quo. This policy requires a long-term commitment and continuing patience. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 provides the way ahead that the Cuban government must follow in order to gain normalized relations with the United States. This option follows the path of the last forty nine years and no significant change is required on the part of the United States. Politically, this avoids the problems generated by going against the Cuban voters of Florida that have been strong supporters of the current policy. The risk is that the United States will miss a window of opportunity to make fundamental positive changes to our relationship with Cuba. Additionally, Cuba could attain economic prosperity in spite of the United States’ actions. Cuba would be forced to continue to look towards China and Venezuela for trade and security relationships. Additionally, for both trade and tourism, Cuba will continue to develop relationships with Canada and the European Union, while the United States’ influence will continue to wane.

**• Strengthen the current policy**. Eliminate the billions of dollars per year in remittances from Cuban-Americans to relatives within Cuba. Work multilaterally with other countries to increase the effectiveness of the current embargoes on trade and travel. Fully implement the “Powell Commission Report” recommendations to end the Castro dictatorship and undermine the succession strategy.31 The Powell Commission Report seeks to reverse the recent economic gains to put added pressure on the government of Cuba. 32 Additionally, pressure the European Union to stop trading with Cuba and restrict the ability of EU citizens to travel to Cuba. The EU nations provide a great opportunity to make up for lost trade with the United States and have a large population of potential tourists for Cuban beaches. The United States must deter actions by the Organization of American States to work closer with Cuba. The Organization of American States should also warn its members to limit the scope of bilateral relations with Cuba in order to support the efforts of the United States. The United States must use Radio and TV Marti to inform the Cuban people of the true cause of their economic difficulty, the dysfunctional communist centrally controlled economy vice economic sanctions. And finally, tighten the noose around the economy and government of Cuba to attempt to bring down the government in a shorter period of time. This option assumes that our current policy is the correct policy, but needs to be strengthened. It eliminates half measures and contradicting policies to produce a more powerful embargo with devastating effect on the Cuban dictatorship. The risk is that the United States will become further isolated from the world in regards to its Cuba policy and will create additional sympathy for Cuba. This could result in open disregard for the embargo by the European Union and other countries interested in trade with Cuba, with a **collapse of** the **effectiveness** of the embargo. The soft power of the United States would suffer with possibly no gain. The United States could lose all possible influence over the future direction of the Cuban government as the Castro regime is replaced.

**• Limited easing of** economic and travel **sanctions.** Engage the Cuban government and reward concessions by easing sanctions. Engage the Cuban government and use a carrot and stick program to encourage the Cuban leadership to transition from a dictatorship towards a more representative form of government, with more emphasis on the stick and less on the carrot. Reward concessions on human rights and moves toward democratization with increased levels of trade and travel. Use the enticement of increased revenue to the government through higher levels of trade as well as the income generated when Americans (of both Cuban descent and nonCuban descent) visit the island and spend dollars. This approach should be less threatening to the Cuban government as they have a level of control over the pace of change. The risk is that the government of Cuba would have the opportunity to adjust to the gradual changes and maintain control while conditions for the Cuban people improve, removing the pressure for a change towards market reforms and a more democratic form of government.

• Support the Cuban people, but not the government. This option would completely and unilaterally lift the embargo on trade and travel.33 Reestablish normal diplomatic relations with Cuba. Engage the Cuban government and use a carrot and stick program to encourage the Cuban leadership to transition from a dictatorship towards a more representative form of government, with more emphasis on the carrot and less on the stick. Included in the carrots are: military to military exchanges and exercises; observer status in the Organization of American States (OAS); and provide assistance transitioning the economic and financial aspects of the economy towards a free market system. Use the economic element of power to demonstrate the superior qualities of a free market economy. Encourage Cuba to allow United States businesses to operate in Cuba without the restrictions of government ownership and government collection of wages for labor. Help Cuba develop an economy that takes advantage of their educated workforce (literacy rate of 99.8%) 34 to move away from low value added products to high value added products with the goal of improving the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and thus the quality of life for the average Cuban citizen. This option has risk politically, as Cuban voters in Florida have traditionally supported isolating the Cuban government and economic sanctions. There are recent indications that Cuban-American opinions are shifting towards more engagement with Cuba. The recent poll conducted by the Brookings Institution, in collaboration with Florida International University and the Cuba Study Group, found that over 55% of Cuban-Americans oppose continuing the embargo and seems to indicate that this risk has lessened recently.35 But, with a viable economy that improves the standard of living for the population of Cuba, their government will feel less pressure to change from a dictatorship into a more representative form of government.

Recommendations

The option with the **greatest possibility of success and reward** for the United States **is to** support the Cuban people, but not the Cuban government. The United States should take the following actions unilaterally • **Lift completely the economic embargo.** Establish banking and financial relationships to facilitate the trading of goods and services between the two countries.

• Lift completely the travel ban to allow not only Cuban-Americans with relatives but also all other Americans to travel to Cuba. This interaction of Americans with Cubans will help raise the awareness of Cubans about their northern neighbor.

• Next, the United States should engage the Cuban government to develop a bilateral trade agreement. The goal of this initiative would be to **achieve normal trade relations** between the two countries.

This leaves the issue of compensation for United States companies and individuals whose property was expropriated by the Cuban government. With the embargo lifted, the United States should enlist the assistance of the European Union and Canada to apply pressure to Cuba as well as to assist in negotiations with the World Trade Organization to address issues with illegally confiscated property.36 The United States will gain leverage with the Cuban government as relations improve, and that will be the time to address human rights in Cuba. The return of the Cuban Five, a group of Cuban spies arrested and convicted in Florida, should be worth some human rights concessions. In Cuba, these men are known as the “Cinco Heroes” and their plight is well known.37 So what leverage do we have now that we have unilaterally given the Cuban government most of what they have wanted? Offer to return back to Cuba the Guantanamo Naval Base after the government of Cuba shifts towards a representative form of government. The foundation for this action has already been laid with the Libertad Act. “The future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, United States policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.” The United States Congress should soften the language referring to a democratically elected government and instead substitute that a representative form of government is required before entering into negotiations for the Guantanamo base. Once Cuba makes changes towards a representative form of government the United States can start working on democratic reforms. The carrot is to offer Cuba, in exchange for changes to a democratic form of government, support for their return to the Organization of American States (OAS). Until Cuba makes changes towards democracy, the United States should block the request of several member states to let Cuba into the organization. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said it well in a recent interview. “Many member countries originally sought to lift the 1962 suspension and allow Cuba to return immediately, without conditions, others agreed with us that the right approach was to replace the suspension — which has outlived its purpose after nearly half a century — with a process of dialogue and a future decision that will turn on Cuba’s commitment to the organization’s values.” These values include promoting democracy and defending human rights. The window of opportunity is open now for this type of change. The Obama administration has taken some steps in this direction with the lifting of remittance limits, unlimited visits to relatives in Cuba, and the ability to provide cell phones to relatives in Cuba. The other recent change is the new majority of Cuban-Americans, in Florida, that support removal of the embargo. Based on votes in the United Nations and the European Union it is clear that world opinion would definitely be supportive of this action. The combination of the above mentioned events now points to an opportunity to make real progress that will benefit both nations. The United States would gain in soft power, gain an additional economic trading partner, and have a chance to influence the type of changes in the Cuban government as the Castro influence wanes. Clearly, support to the Cuban people will indirectly provide support to the Cuban government, but that could work against the regime as well if the people realize that improvements in their living conditions are not the result of communism, but from the interaction with the capitalist world. There is a sound reason for unilaterally lifting the trade and travel embargoes without first seeing positive actions from the Cuban government. From Cuba expert Carlos A. Saladrigas, Co-Chairman, Cuba Study Group, “We can go back in the history -- in the 50-year history of United States-Cuba relations and clearly see that any time we begin to see a little bit of relaxation of tensions in the relationship, whenever we begin to see a little bit of openness on the part of the United States or Cuba, historically the Cuban government has done something to counteract that trend and significantly revert back to their playbook.” 40 The United States needs to take the initiative away from the Castro regime, and have them react to actions they have publicly called for (removal of the embargo), but in reality are unsure of the second and third order effects and their ability to control the outcome. One of the first problems for the Cuban government after the removal of the embargo will be the excuse for the poor performing economy. “… the embargo and the United States policy of confrontation and isolation have been incredibly useful to the Cuban regime as an alibi for the failures of the regime to meet the fundamental needs of the people on the island, but also is a significant source of legitimacy, both internal and external.” 41 Conclusion This situation may present the United States with the opportunity to step in to assist with market reforms if the Cuban economy sputters and the government realizes they don’t have a scapegoat. The efforts expended by the United States to keep the embargo effective, the loss of trade, and the loss of soft power in most of the world are clearly not worth it in comparison to the threat that Cuba poses today. The gains to be achieved by following any path other than the unilateral removal of the economic and travel embargoes are small in comparison to the overall costs of continuing the current failed policy. The United States is losing far too much soft power in its efforts to punish and isolate the government of Cuba. American firms could be left out of any economic gains as Cuba continues to grow its economy. As Cuba emerges from the economic difficulties of the last two decades, the United States has an opportunity to influence the future direction of our southern neighbor. The current United States policy has many passionate defenders, and their criticism of the Castro regime is justified. Nevertheless, we must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances United States interests.42 The United States cannot afford to miss out on the window of opportunity to affect a positive change in the relationship with Cuba. If Cuba is able to continue on a path of economic progress and emerge once again as a true regional power, with communism intact, the United States will be the loser in this half century struggle. Cuba is spreading its limited influence to Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, and will be ready to bring in any other countries in the Americas that want to move away from the United States orbit. The United States can’t stand by and watch Cuba regain strength, intact as a communist country, but must take this opportunity to create an inflection point for Cuba that guides her onto a path that will benefit the nations of the Americas.

#### The impact is the *Cuban health care sector*—it depends upon a *democratic* and *market-based* transition

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As a transition occurs, further deterioration of medical care services and, in turn, the public’s health is likely to take place. Indeed, often during transitions, a reallocation of funds occurs to meet other needs of the changing state. Health care services are at risk under such a real location. This is what countries in Eastern Europe experienced subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Union (WHO Regional Office 1998). Further, when changes occur in economic, political, and/or social conditions, there appear to be greater incidences of heart disease and suicide due to stress, especially among the young and middle-aged male population (“UNICEF Warns” 1994). When socioeconomic pressures manifest themselves in these ways, they add further strains on an already overburdened health care system. Transition may open up additional important roles for NGOs. The influence of NGOs to date has been limited in Cuba, due to distrust regarding their political motivations (Gonzalez and Coil 1997) and the role of a centralized government in making services available independently of NGOs. In other countries during transitions, NGOs have had a strong track record of providing assistance to restore infrastructure and provide basic food, shelter, and health care needs. Their role may be of great importance in Cuba’s transition. One area of focus would be in rural regions, where indications are that infrastructure has deteriorated and health problems have been even more prominent than in urban areas. NGOs may also be involved in assessing the continued provision of basic medical services and blood bank services, as they did once before when Castro first came to power and a health care personnel exodus caused a crisis (Claudio 1999). Indeed, one of the many functions that NGOs can have during a period of transition is the tracking of medical data. Even if a transition is smooth with insignificant changes in political processes, blood supply and vaccination programs nonetheless will be put at risk. NGOs can help to ensure the continuation of global immunizations and the safety of the blood supply. These programs will have to be monitored closely, as a breakdown would be very problematic for the country. Depending upon the openness of the new regime. NGOs will have a strong or a minimal role. The needs, however, that could be served by NGOs will be diverse and significant. **The nature of regime change will be instrumental** in determining the future focus of Cuban society as well as the level of openness to the growth of NGO involvement, private sector participation, and the provision of health care. With all that could potentially occur, there are certain indications that opportunities for development of a private sector, including the medical private sector, may be limited, even though there is so much potential. The actual outcome is a **function of the type of political system that emerges** after Castro is no longer on the scene. Several writers have been developing theories relating to democratization and emergence of a market-based economy. Edward Gonzalez of the RAND Corporation argues that a number of potential scenarios exist in a post-Castro Cuba (Gonzalez and ColI 1997). These scenarios would, in turn, impact the health care delivery system in the country. Gonzalez argues that the probability of a reformist or a coalition government. focused on democratic reform and the development of market systems, is quite limited He indicates that as Castro passes on, a strong possibility is that the military, under the direction of Raúl Castro, Fidel’s brother, would retain power with a possible allowance for minimal market opportunities. A second scenario reflects the establishment of a coalition government, although Gonzalez claims that the possibility of an open coalition is not great. Gonzalez suggests that there is so much invested in the underlying concepts of the Fidelistas and so much distrust of any reform movement, either from within or from outside the country by the Cuban exile community, that this is not a viable option. As such, the opportunities for a market-based health care system layered upon the current public health care system may also be limited in scope. As Alberto Coil indicates in his paper. The Future of US-Cuban Relations, the importance of social security cannot be overestimated (Gonzalez and Coil 1997). Fear of the impact of market reform on distribution of wealth is of great concern. Further, the advent of capitalism is not without consequences. Full employment, zero inflation, and perceived egalitarianism have been mainstays of the Castro communist system (putting aside the strong black market that exists in the country). Fears of loss of jobs, security, and homes, and reduced access to a perceived high-quality health care system are some of the concerns that would accompany any market reforms. Policy changes will have to be introduced very carefully, smoothly, and incrementally in a post-Castro Cuba, even though, as indicated, elements of it already exist. The implication, however, from these studies is that there may be only limited prospects for real market-based health care reform in the near term. More widespread reforms may only be forthcoming over time. With the end of the Fidel Castro regime, negligible changes in the politics within Cuba and in foreign relations and trade between Cuba and the United States are indeed a possibility. Recent moves to strengthen the military infrastructure within the country seem to indicate this. If little political change occurs after a regime change, U.S. frustration will cause, if anything, increased U.S. restraints on trade with Cuba. If this scenario occurs, then it is quite possible that there will be more of the same, namely, continued deterioration of the economic situation within Cuba with carryover to the health care sector. One can assume that the medical infrastructure, operating under compromised conditions within hospitals and clinics, would continue to deteriorate, with even more constraints on technology and equipment and fewer basic sanitary supplies. Housing and food shortages and current nutritional concerns would not be alleviated; vulnerable populations would continue to be at risk, and their health care problems would become worse. This would put increased strains on the already stressed medical care system. It is reasonable to expect that aggregate mental health would also continue to decline with resultant increases in murder and suicide rates. The government of Cuba would attempt to counter this situation by generating revenues with increased tourism, a factor already discussed as one of the major causes of an increased incidence of STDs and AIDS and a variable affecting the high rate of abortion in the country. More efforts to trade doctors and medications for oil will result from continued political processes, as Cuba will seek markets that are not foreclosed to trade. With this situation, however, will come continued frustration on the part of medical professionals. A combination of an oversupply of medical personnel, poor working conditions. and very poor remuneration will only reduce the morale of the medical care workforce even further. Ultimately, all these stresses will have consequences in terms of stress on the political system. The period of transition post-Castro will be an extremely critical period in the lives of Cubans. So far, we have discussed issues associated with changes inside the country. What about the potential for investment of foreign capital in medical and health care from external sources? Again, concerns relate to the concept of significant market opportunities in Cuba after the fall of Castro. These opportunities may actually be more limited than has been anticipated by the exile community, not only for political reasons but also for economic reasons. Pointing out the large amount of foreign debt Cuba owes to numerous Western and Eastern Bloc countries and the fact that the economy has been handicapped over the last 10 to 15 years, Jaime Suchlicki indicates that these circumstances reinforce the concept that Cuba is now a poor country without the near-term resources to rebuild (1997). Until the economy improves and at least some of the debt is repaid or resolved, there may be fewer opportunities for investment in Cuba than many anticipate. If there are to be any major opportunities for investment and potential growth, they may be found in the health care industry. As discussed, Cuba has developed its own pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries out of necessity. The country has highly trained scientific and medical talent and has invested in an infrastructure to meet domestic needs. Further, Cuba has sold pharmaceutical supplies and biotechnology in foreign markets, but it has been essentially foreclosed from selling to less developed countries, as they do not necessarily have the financial resources to afford products produced by Cuban firms. Given that Cuba’s talented and experienced professionals are paid minimally and that the appropriate infrastructures for production, research, and development are in place, partnerships with U.S. and other foreign-based pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms may present worthwhile opportunities for all parties. Foreign pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms would have access to relatively inexpensive professional labor and capital. The potential for scientists’ brain drain, just as for medical personnel, could be lowered by offering professionals financial incentives to remain in the country. Partnerships like these would stimulate an infusion of new capital into Cuba, and the participation of foreign firms would allow for the **expansion of output into the international marketplace**, currently foreclosed to Cuban producers. With an infusion of capital, additional technology, necessary inputs, and know- how, these firms will be able to meet the pharmaceutical needs of the domestic economy as well. Such partnerships will also encourage imports of other necessary pharmaceuticals: hence, a wide selection of medications would be available. **Such opportunities hinge upon the** post-Castro **administration’s degree of openness and disposition toward the rest of the world.** Transition, by its very nature, brings about instability. This is especially true when transitions rarely occur, offering few patterns associated with change. As Fidel Castro leaves power, whether voluntarily, by force, or by death, there will be many unknowns. This monograph has attempted to provide insights into how health care systems may react and adjust to change. Ultimately, we will not know the outcome until a change actually occurs. What is certain, however, is the fact that the health care system in Cuba will be an extremely important component of any political, economic, and social transition in the country as well as in this active region of the world.

#### That model stops disease spread worldwide

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Infectious diseases The combination of high levels of community participation, access to primary care and an aggressive public health approach has made the Cuban campaign against epidemic infectious diseases particularly successful.58–60 A number of common illnesses have been eliminated altogether, often for the first time in any country [poliomyelitis (1962), neonatal tetanus (1972), diphtheria (1979), measles (1993), pertussis (1994), rubella and mumps (1995)]. In 1962, against the advice of external health officials, ‘vaccination days’ were established with the goal of reaching the entire population. When this method quickly proved to be effective in eliminating polio it was subsequently adopted elsewhere as the primary strategy.58 After dengue was introduced in 1981 Cuba adopted a campaign of community mobilization, focusing on elimination of mosquito breeding sites, which lead to prompt control.20,58,59 International attention for infectious disease control in Cuba has focused primarily on HIV/AIDS.10,20,61–63 Among 300 000 military personnel returning from Africa in the 1980s 84 were found to be infected with the virus [Ref. (20), p. 85]. A nation-wide screening programme which began in 1987 reached 80% of the sexually active population (~3.5 million people) and identified 268 HIV-positive individuals.20 In the initial phases, the Cuban HIV/AIDS strategy provoked controversy, some of which was negative.20,64 While assessing the public health impact of this unknown epidemic, persons infected with HIV were quarantined in health facilities where they received supplemental nutrition and available medical care.20,61,62 Treatment is now provided in the outpatient setting; domestically produced triple therapy has been provided free to all paediatric patients since 1998 and to adults with HIV or AIDS since 2000.62 With the rapid increase in foreign tourists, and the development of a local sex trade, the HIV incidence has risen in the past 5 years, although it remains the lowest in the Americas.23 Increased integration into the global economy may continue to pose challenges which Cuban public health has not previously had to address. Cuba’s role in global health assistance Given its limited economic resources, Cuba can only rarely afford direct aid.20 Instead it has adopted a strategy that relies on human resources. First targeted to Africa, the programme has now placed physicians, nurses, dentists, and other professionals in 52 countries.20,65,66 The most prominent episodes involved sending doctors to post-apartheid South Africa, providing long-term care for Chernobyl victims, and giving disaster aid to Central America after hurricane Mitch. Cuban personnel also staffed a new hospital in Gonaives, Haiti, which had been constructed with the Japanese aid; this facility was subsequently destroyed during the anti-Aristide strife in 2004 although the Cuban physicians have remained.67 To move from emergency assistance to a sustainable programme, a multicountry collaborative plan has recently been developed to improve health services in poor Latin American countries.66 A medical school was established in Havana in 1999 and more than 6000 students, primarily from Africa and Latin America, are currently being given a medical education at no expense.7,68,69 In the past 3 years more than 14 000 physicians and dentists have been placed in slums and rural communities in Venezuela as part of the new the partnership between Cuba and the Chavez government, and this number is set to rise to 20 000.68 Cuba has also agreed to educate 40 000 new physicians for Venezuela over the next several years.69 Cuba’s medical assistance campaign has a number of dimensions. Like all foreign aid programmes, it assumes that some political benefits will be forthcoming in return. However, most of the countries that have been assisted, for example, Ethiopia, The Gambia, and Haiti, have nothing to offer in return. Unlike many donor programmes, placing physicians where none have practiced before has been overwhelmingly well received by the local communities.69 Thus, while the arrangement with Venezuela has direct economic benefit to Cuba, it has also transformed the health system by giving large segments of the Venezuelan population access to modern medical care.69 The special character of health sector development in Cuba can perhaps be best appreciated by considering the challenge any other society would face if it tried to send tens of thousands of physicians to live in slum communities in a foreign country for 2 years. While a range of incentives and motivating factors unique to the Cuban social context are operating, these assignments are accepted as a professional obligation by the vast majority of the Cuban practitioners and they perform effectively in the host communities. Much like the experience of military personnel on long tours of duty, the Cuban programme of assistance does nonetheless require extraordinary sacrifice and the hardship is not always borne lightly. Furthermore, the mobilization for assistance to Venezuela has meant that many Cuban neighbourhoods must share facilities. These sacrifices must, of course, be balanced against the conditions of desperate need in the communities on the receiving end. Many of these countries, particularly in Africa, have watched helplessly as the majority of their health professionals emigrate to the US and Europe.70 Offhand dismissal by observers in industrialized countries of the Cuban medical aid programme, which has such a powerful impact on these marginalized communities, is a clear indication of how perilously divided the discourse over global development has become. Does Cuba’s experience have broader significance? The history of science is replete with stories of the delayed acceptance of unpopular or unfashionable ideas. The approach to improving global health taken by the donor community and academic medicine in rich countries is no exception. While criticisms of the basic approach are voiced—as in the recent assertion that the external measures of development have no meaning for the general population71,72—these critical voices have little influence on the practice of large international agencies. It is not the intent of this article, however, to summarize and make a judgment on economic assistance and progress in global public health. Instead, based on the weight of the evidence presented on the Cuban experience, we pose the following question: ‘Why has the debate on solving the most urgent challenges in public health in poor countries ignored the experience of success?’ Traditionally, whether the experience is derived from randomized trials, high survival rates in clinical series, or favourable trends in vital statistics, biomedicine embraces the winner and seeks to imitate it. Precisely the opposite has happened in this instance. There is, of course, no shortage of historical and ideological reasons why a debate on the ‘Cuban question’ has never reached maturity. Blind optimism is thought to have discredited the sympathetic scholarship about the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent China, in an earlier era.73–75 Some observers are too concerned about putative restraints on civil liberties and the independent character of its foreign policy to develop any enthusiasm for the objectively more successful aspects of Cuban society. None of these concerns, however, undermine the force of the question, why have we ignored what works? Before recommending components of the Cuban model for use in other settings, a thorough and balanced assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of those components would be required. That assessment would require a very different study of the health system’s organization, capacity, and services. Our intent here is to demonstrate that sufficient cause exists to undertake that assessment. For an objective evaluation of the Cuban experience to succeed, an acceptance of certain ground rules would be required. First, this evaluation cannot be undertaken with the goal of winning a political argument. Although the trajectory of social development in Cuba over the past 50 years is both complex and controversial, as in all other countries, the public health experience should be subjected to judgment on the basis of the usual rules of science. Second, this judgment cannot be permanently postponed by skepticism about the validity of the data or concern over unrelated broader social questions. Ongoing, careful scrutiny of Cuban public health data is justified and to be welcomed; however, sufficient data now exist in several key areas to demonstrate that skepticism can no longer be the basis for a refusal to engage the question. Likewise, many societies embrace domestic and foreign policies that are questioned and even condemned by broad segments of the world community, yet the attempt to evaluate progress in improving the health of their populations is not thereby condemned as illegitimate or unnecessary. Third, the apparent successes recorded by Cuba should be seen as consequences of a well-defined strategy; the value of these underlying principles, not the accumulation of better numbers, is what holds implications for other poor countries, and not a few well-resourced societies. Two aspects of the Cuban experience serve as reasonable demonstrations of the value of that strategic approach. In the area of infectious disease, for example, the operative principles are particularly straightforward: once a safe and effective vaccine becomes available the entire at-risk population is immunized; if a vaccine is not available, the susceptible population is screened and treated; where an arthropod vector can be identified, the transmission pathway is disrupted by mobilizing the local community which in turn requires effective neighbourhood organization and universal primary health care. The joint effect of these strategic activities will result in the elimination or control of virtually all serious epidemic infectious conditions. In terms of child survival, a ‘continuum of care’ that provides for the pre-conceptional health of women, prenatal care, skilled birth attendants, and a comprehensive well-baby programme can quickly reduce infant mortality to levels approaching the biological minimum. Many observers will regard these propositions as reasonable, yet hopelessly too ambitious for the poorer nations of the world. It must be recognized, however, that these principles have been successfully implemented in Cuba at a cost well within the reach of most middle-income countries. Although other aspects of society, such as education and housing obviously make independent contributions to the success of public health campaigns, the Cuban strategy outlined here serves as a model that should be thoroughly evaluated. Needless to say, its implementation would face many challenges specific to the geography and politics of a region. Other models that dictate public health strategies face the same gamut of uncertainties and challenges, however, and none can be said to have met with similar success.76 The World Health Organization, for example, promulgated a set of principles in the Alma Ata ‘Health for All’ Declaration of 1978, many of which were incorporated into the Cuban approach.77 In recent years, however, international agencies have favoured privatization and reduction in state support for health systems.78 The record of achievement with privatized systems in poor countries has often been very limited.79 A debate which can use as a point of departure extensive empirical evidence of progress would provide a healthy reorientation in a discipline distracted by controversy and divided over political aims. The health professions have little opportunity to intervene directly on historical events. However, in the conduct of our science we have both choice and responsibility. Challenging the acquiescence of the scientific community to ostracism of some of its members in an earlier era, Einstein remarked, ‘Political considerations, advanced with much solemnity, prevent... the purely objective ways of thinking without which our great aims must necessarily be frustrated’ [Ref. (80) p. 80]. If the accomplishments of Cuba could be reproduced across a broad range of poor and middle-income countries **the health of the world’s population would be transformed**. This fact creates an obligation for health scientists. We should debate the merits of the principles embedded in the Cuban attempts to improve the health of populations.

#### Global pandemics are coming and direct US intervention fails

Weber 06 – Steven Weber is a Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. (“How Globalization Went Bad”, Foreign Policy, December 27, 2006, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/12/27/how\_globalization\_went\_bad?page=0,2)

The same is true for global public health. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Humans cannot outsmart disease, because it just evolves too quickly. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes, while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. These are often the same countries, perhaps not entirely coincidentally, that feel threatened by American power. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases -- exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today -- will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don't want it. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIV-like pandemic are the countries that simply won't let U.S. or other Western agencies in, including the World Health Organization. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. What's needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work, a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. As long as the United States remains the world's lone superpower, we're not likely to get any help. Even after HIV, SARS, and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu, the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. America can't change that alone.

#### Zoonotic diseases specifically lead to extinction

Casadevall 12 – Prof @ Department of Microbiology and Immunology and the Division of Infectious Diseases of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine Arturo. (“The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology, p. 584-5)

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided **unequivocal evidence** for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and **have no need for a host**, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Tayloret al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

### 1AC—Agriculture

#### CONTENTION 2 IS SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE:

#### Cuban agriculture sustainability is failing—foreign investment is key

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Cuba needed an alternative agricultural model when foreign oil imports were cut off significantly at the end of the 1980s, and the partial opening of the Cuban economy, focused on creating more autonomous agricultural cooperatives, in the 1990s helped diversity food crops and set Cuba along a path of increased food security. The Cuban model was initiated out of necessity, not because of any sort of Cuban environmental consciousness, yet better environmental conditions went hand in hand with the new development strategy. Cuba learned the limits of their agricultural model under their socialist economic system and it is in need of further transformation in both the agriculture and energy sectors. A further opening of the economy to joint ventures could help with updating the power grid and providing more sources of renewable energy – potentially expanding Cuba’s potential for a more sustainable means of energy security. Further, Cuba needs foreign investment to update agriculture facilities and take maximum advantage of cogeneration and biofuel potential with sugarcane waste. The strong state control of farming practices, used to successfully jumpstart the alternative model, has hit its limit. The Cuban government must begin loosening its grips on the domestic economy to allow for more competition in the farming sector. Despite the potential to become more sustainable with a purposive and focused opening of the economy, the recent surge in joint venture investment on expanding domestic oil extraction, petrochemical facilities, and oil refinery infrastructure reveals a trend toward decreasing environmental sustainability. Once heralded as the world’s most sustainable country by coupling environmental performance indicators with their human development scores, Cuba is slipping further away from this goal. Perhaps the most distressing part of this current trend is that it took Cuba decades to create a national identity that embraced sustainable environmental practices in both the energy and agricultural sector, and it seemingly took only a couple of years to derail these efforts. Undoubtedly, conservation efforts and sustainable education programs can only satiate citizen’s energy desires to a certain point. In order to further the quality of life in the country, electric production must increase to rural areas with little energy infrastructure and to Havana in order to spur foreign investment and domestic small business growth. Cuba’s trade agreement with Venezuela is bringing in much-needed petroleum for electricity production, but their dependence on a relatively unstable country for crude is trapping them into the same relationship that crippled their economy in 1990 – impairing their original goal of self-sufficiency. Cuba is at a turning point in their path toward environmental sustainability, and the current need for immediate foreign capital and increased energy production seem to be trumping its desire to achieve development sustainably. Cuba still has enough centralized control to leap-frog dirty electric production for cleaner renewable forms of energy and the potential to guide development strategies that emphasize investments in and research on renewable energy. It can utilize its expertise on organic farming strategies to increase sugar production in a much more ecologically friendly manner than their monoculture approach in the 1970s and 80s. Decisions made in the next five years will demonstrate whether Cuba embraces their newly created national identity as a society striving for sustainable development or rejects the goal of sustainable development to increase short-term capital and energy needs.

#### The plan provides foreign capital to Cuba and allows its model to be exported globally

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Cuba today is experiencing the most rapid shifts towards privatization and reform since the revolution more than sixty years ago. Though truly open trade with Cuba will remain out of reach until the embargo is relaxed or a new trade agreement is reached, it is worth the time of agricultural and business entities in the United States to consider how they may approach doing business in Cuba. Given the extent of pre-embargo trade between the United States and Cuba it is no stretch to imagine the enormous possibilities once that partnership is reestablished. Though reforms over the past decade have made significant progress towards this end, they only scratch the surface on what Cuba has to offer. The two economic areas where Cuba shows perhaps the most promise and have the greatest potential for international trade and investment are tourism and agriculture. Tourism shows great promise simply for the fact that for more than half a century the country has been entirely cut off from open trade and travel by U.S. citizens, citizens who will likely flock to the country once access is restored. Agriculture in Cuba also presents numerous unique opportunities, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union the country has developed novel agricultural production techniques that could help serve a growing demand for natural, organic foods in the United States. While tourism may increase economic opportunity for existing businesses and industries, Cuba’s agricultural model, on the other hand, presents unique opportunities to both existing and entirely new busi-ness opportunities in the United States. A. Cuba as a Tourist Destination Prior to the embargo, Cuba was a travel destination for as many as 300,000 American tourists per year.91 Tourists from various Soviet Bloc nations never came close to making up this loss in travel, reaching no more than 30,000tourists per year.92 Since the demise of the Soviet Union, however, tourism to the island has continued to increase dramatically. As of July 2012, Cuba is the sec-ond most popular tourist destination in the Caribbean region, trailing only the Dominican Republic.93 Slightly more than two million tourists per year now visit the island as of 2011, representing growth of 7.3% over the last year alone.94 Asof 2005, Cuba’s service sector accounted for 67.8% of the nation’s annual gross domestic product, eclipsing traditional Cuban exports such as nickel and sugar.95Tourist infrastructure in Cuba, however, has strained to accommodate the rapid surge in visitors, with hotels, resorts, restaurants, and other accommodations showing their age after decades of relatively little improvement or investment.96Depending on the precise means through which the travel and economic embargos are lifted, estimates of the number of U.S. visitors expected to visit Cuba within the first year range from six hundred thousand to more than one million, with up to five million visitors per year by the fifth year of open travel.97 There is the potential for modest yet not insignificant job growth in response to new travel opportunities, with potentially over twelve thousand new service sector and trav-el jobs in the United States within five years.98B. Agricultural Trade with Cuba It is the agricultural sector, however, that provides some of the most substantial and intriguing opportunities for both trade with Cuba and the creation of entirely new businesses in the United States. In fact, agricultural products were the very first items traded between the United States and Cuba since the embargo in December of 2001, when two ships loaded with chicken and corn arrived inHavana.99 The potential for the U.S. agricultural sector is abundantly clear when the sheer volume of Cuba’s agricultural imports are taken into account. In 2008,Cuba imported approximately $1.8 billion in agricultural goods.100 Only approximately 40% of imported agricultural goods were from the United States, leaving over $1 billion of trade going to other countries.101Cuba itself is very much in favor of increased agricultural trade with the United States simply for the logistical simplicity and cost-savings it would pro-vide.102 Import costs account for as much as 35% of the goods Cuba currently imports from its trading partners.103 Because Cuba is less than one hundred miles from the coast of the United States, the country is naturally eager to enter into trade relationships that lead to lower transportation costs.104 Cuban officials cite rice as just one example of an agricultural product that they would be inter-ested in obtaining from the United States.106 Rice is a staple food for Cuban citizens, and they enjoy it with almost every meal.107 Presently, the bulk of their rice must be imported from Eastern Asia, meaning a long voyage by sea and the expenses that go along with shipping tons of goods across the Pacific Ocean.108Rice exports alone present an enormous opportunity for U.S. producers. The United States is a major exporter of both processed and unprocessed rice, accounting for 10% of all international trade in rice each year.109 Half of annual U.S. rice sales come from the export market, and the United States is considered a reliable supplier of a quality product on the international market.110 The USDA estimates that if the current restrictions on trade were removed, Cuba could potentially exceed Mexico and Japan as the biggest importer of rice grown in the United States.111 As of September 2005, Cuba estimated that they could purchase more than one million metric tons of rice annually, but restrictions make it unlikely that import from the United States will go much beyond current levels of 712,000 metric tons.112 A key obstacle, according to Cuba, is the requirement that all shipments of agricultural products from the United States be paid for in cash before they leave port.113 This resulted in a reduction in rice ex-ports to Cuba by nearly 50% from 2004 to 2005, according to the USA Rice Fed-eration.114 For the foreseeable future, any effort by agricultural groups in the United States to take advantage of trade opportunities with Cuba will have to operate within the guidelines and policy directives of Cuba as well as the United States. One risk that any organization that wishes to trade with Cuba might encounter is that their proposals and business plans will run into red tape not only through regulations in the United States, but through conflict with the Communist Party of Cuba, which still holds tremendous sway over policy and business decisions on the island. Cuban officials are, of course, aware of the tremendous opportunity that trade with the United States might bring to their country, and for the most part remain eager to pursue closer ties with whom they see as their closest, most natu-ral trading partner.115 Roy Ramón Philippón, a leading official with the Cuban Society of Agrarian Law, indicated that the country recognizes that changes are necessary in order to properly compete with and participate in an open globalmarket.116 Long gone are the days when Cuba could count on highly subsidized exports to the Soviet Bloc as a stable source of income.117 For the first forty years of Cuba’s “socialist experiment” following their revolution, the first priority for the Cuban government was to provide the maximum amount of social services and benefit to the population regardless of the cost; something that they could achieve through trade with the Soviet Bloc prior to its collapse.118The process of reform in Cuba is necessarily dependent upon the approv-al of the national Communist Party. All of the reforms that have been put in place must be considered by and ultimately recommended by the Communist Party operating under their internal guidelines.119 By its nature this is intended to be a slow, deliberative process, the intent of which is to allow all interested gov-ernment officials, business representatives, and interested citizens to voice their opinions and for the Party’s guidelines to take each group’s concerns into ac-count.120Cuba has continued to introduce new programs to assist local producers in becoming more productive while also promoting ecological restoration andpreservation.121 In a shift away from the large state-run farms that characterized Cuban agriculture for much of the twentieth century, Cuba is now focused on diversifying agricultural production through a variety of both privately run and some state-controlled enterprises.122Cuban officials responsible for investigating and recommending addi-tional improvements to the Cuban agricultural system echo this call for reform and increased efficiency and productivity.123 Cuban officials point to the two primary goals that Cuba is pursuing in its efforts to improve its agricultural out-put and modernize their agricultural system; eco-restoration and preservation and urban and suburban agriculture.124 In addition, while the country is desirous of increasing its agricultural exports as a source of income, enough of the goods produced must be funneled into an official state-controlled market that can con-trol prices and ensure that food is affordable even to those with low incomes.125The first priority before any additional exports can be considered is to increase production for local consumption to the point where the country could conceiva-bly become self-sustaining for the majority of its food production needs.126 Once they are producing enough food for local consumption, then priorities may shift towards producing additional crops for export; coffee in particular is one locally produced crop that Cuba is particularly interested in increasing production for both local consumption and export.127Government officials recognize that the Cuban economy is in a relatively underdeveloped state, and future policies will need to be responsive to the state’s economic needs as well as their agricultural ones.128 If, for example, the price of corn were to skyrocket on the world market, Cuban officials indicate that if it made economic sense, they “would cover this island with corn.”129 Similar to the practices of the former Soviet Bloc, the Cuban economy is still very much orga-nized and planned by the state, and the current agricultural plan in Cuba is de-signed to cover the next five years of anticipated growth.130As for direct investment by foreign investors and producers, current poli-cies in Cuba will make that somewhat difficult for the foreseeable future, as all direct business relationships with foreign entities are currently organized and controlled by a number of governmental bodies.131 Cuban officials indicate that future reforms could conceivably open the door to direct investment and transac-tions between Cuban agricultural producers and foreign buyers.132 Understanding this future opportunity first requires a digression into the organizational structure employed in Cuba to manage and direct the agricultural system in Cuba. V. NEW REFORMS The current agricultural system has gone through a period of significant readjustment since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1993, Cuba started to move away from enormous state-run facilities and fully embraced a model of cooperative ownership that it had first introduced in the 1970s with the cooperativa de producción agropecuaria, or CPA.133 The new model, the basic unit of cooperative production, or UBPC, was introduced in September of 1993,and by 1995 there were 2855 UBPCs in operation.134 The UBPC differs from the CPA in that a UBPC operates on land that continues to be owned by the state but is provided to farmers in the form of a usufruct agreement, while a CPA is made up of lands that groups of farmers already had in their possession.135 By the endof 2007, the UBPC had far exceeded the CPA in the amount of land being farmed, with more than 2.8 million hectares of land organized under the UBPC system, compared to just under 700,000 hectares in CPAs.136 The majority of farmland in Cuba remained under state control as of the end of 2007, with more than 6 million hectares of farmland overseen by the state.137Both the UBPCs and the CPAs operate under an arrangement whereby the state provides assistance in the form of access to credit and a market for the goods produced, and in exchange the production cooperatives provide a certain quota of goods for sale and distribution by the state.138 One of the key objectives in the legislation itself is that the farms shall “be owners of the means of produc-tion and of the crop,” while still retaining ownership of the land in state hands.139Goals of this new organization were to improve efficiency and encourage more productive use of land. The goals of the Cuban Revolution continue to be em-bodied in the legislation that created these entities.140In 2008, Cuba passed what is perhaps the most substantial piece of agri-cultural legislation in decades. Named simply “Law 259,” it provides a means for almost any Cuban citizen, existing farm, or authorized agency to acquire un-used state lands and put them to better use as farmland.141 This is a substantial departure from the earlier CPA and UBCP systems that for the most part only transferred existing agricultural land controlled by the state into quasi-privatecooperatives.142 Law 259 continues the usufruct method of land distribution pio-neered by the UBPC system and allows for any interested, qualified party to ap-ply for an initial tract of a maximum of 13.42 hectares (33.16 acres), with their ownership potentially increasing to up to 40.26 hectares (99.48 acres) in the fu-ture.143 Continued operation of farmland granted under this program is contin-gent upon the land being used in a productive, sustainable manner with appropri-ate environmental conservation measures.144Even with the new reforms, the land is still technically tied to the state, and individuals who take possession of land under this program are not permitted to sell or rent the land to others, though the state will compensate landowners for the improvements they have made to the land during their term of tenancy.145The CPA, UBPC, and now Law 259 reforms Cuba put in place, along with reforms the Cuban government is discussing for the future, mean that opportunities for further U.S. involvement in Cuban agriculture are numerous. Presently, foreign companies that wish to enter into business relation-ships with Cuban counterparts must do so almost entirely via official government channels.146 Government agencies such as the Ministry of Sugar or the Ministry of Agriculture are responsible for managing trade for their respective indus-tries.147 All imports of food and other agricultural products must first enter the country via Alimport, a state-run agency that handles the entire sales process from securing contracts and arranging for payment to managing the distributionprocess.148 For the time being, the sole agency that U.S. companies wishing to engage in agricultural trade in Cuba can work with is Alimport.149 Rarely will there be any contact directly between U.S. companies and end-users in Cuba.150The process in the United States can be similarly convoluted. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security oversees all busi-ness negotiations with Cuban companies, and notifications of sales must be sub-mitted through them before a license will be granted.151 Since U.S. policy still prohibits the extension of credit to any Cuban banks, all payments either have tobe paid for in cash prior to shipment or a confirmed letter-of-credit can be com-pleted with a bank located in a third country.152 In an unusual and unfortunate overlap in U.S. policy directives, goods that are paid for in cash prior to shipment are legally Cuban property though still in the United States, and potentially sub-ject to seizure on behalf of Cuban exiles within the United States who have out-standing legal and monetary claims against the Cuban government.153 Ships with goods meant for Cuba, however, may leave port as soon as payment is either received in cash or confirmed deposited in a foreign bank, a clarification made by the Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Asset Control in July 2005 in an attempt to reduce anxiety over this possibility.154José Garea Alonso, an official with the Cuban Ministry of Agriculture, indicated that recent legislation such as Law 259 is the start of what may eventu-ally lead to more direct commercial ties between Cuban organizations and foreign buyers or investors.155 At the moment, Cuba’s agricultural cooperatives are relatively small and continue to rely on the state for the bulk of their marketingopportunities.156 In the future, these cooperatives may be allowed to join together to form larger groups of linked agricultural cooperatives working together to manage their own affairs, and may include the ability to directly negotiate with foreign buyers rather than requiring an intervening hand from Alimport or anoth-er appropriate ministry.157Foreign investment in Cuban businesses has only been possible in a lim-ited form since the early 1980s, when the Cuban government introduced legisla-tion allowing for foreign entities to create a joint venture with the Cuban gov-ernment for investment purposes.158 Ultimately, the goal of this legislation was to provide an easier means for Cuba to acquire additional foreign currency to inject into its economy.159 Even with the new law, regulations prohibited any foreign participant in a joint enterprise from controlling more than 49%, though such a restriction was not in place for a partnership.160VI. NEW OPPORTUNITIES While investment in Cuban businesses and sales or purchases of Cuban products must still move through official channels under the joint venture law or other Cuban programs, the time is ripe for organizations in the United States to begin laying groundwork for closer ties with Cuban agricultural entities. Recent regulatory changes implemented by the U.S. government provide a means for individuals and businesses to begin forming the relationships with their Cuban counterparts that will lead to future trade opportunities.161As previously mentioned, recent changes in U.S. policy now allow for any individual in the United States, not simply relatives, to donate money to Cu-ban citizens, though not to exceed $500 for any three month consecutive period, with the only restriction being that the recipient is not an official in the Cuban government or the Communist Party.162 Specifically written into these new regu-lations is the idea that these remittances may be spent “to support the develop-ment of private businesses.”163 A five hundred dollar infusion of capital to sup-port a fledging business or farm can be enormously beneficial when the average monthly salary is only 448 pesos, or approximately twenty dollars.164Additional capital will enable small Cuban farms to expand operations by hiring additional help or perhaps purchasing additional farm animals. While purchasing a tractor may seem like an obvious choice for a growing farm, Medardo Naranjo Valdes of the Organoponico Vivero Alamar, a UBPC just out-side of Havana, indicated that farm animals such as oxen would remain the pre-ferred choice for the foreseeable future on the small and midsized farms that make up the majority of the newer agricultural cooperatives.165 Not only do farm animals not require gasoline or incur maintenance costs beyond perhaps an occa-sional veterinarian charge, their waste can be used as fertilizer. Apart from additional labor, funds provided to agricultural cooperatives could be put to use in developing innovative pest control techniques that do not require the use of expensive pesticides or other chemicals. The Vivero Alamar is currently experimenting with a variety of natural pest control techniques such as introducing plants that serve as natural repellents to insects and the introduction of other insects that feed on harmful pests without harming the crops.166Investment in agricultural cooperatives done in this manner will likely fail to see much return on the investment for their foreseeable future, until poli-cies in both the United States and Cuba are changed.167 For a relatively small sum, American investors will get not only the benefit of a close relationship with a Cuban farm that will become a new source of both import and export business in the future, but potentially gain access to innovative agricultural techniques that could be used in the United States immediately.168 Because the logistical structure needed to transport goods from large ru-ral farms into city markets remains underdeveloped, urban and suburban agricul-ture makes up a growing portion of the food produced and consumed in Cuba.169 As in other countries, the population trends in Cuba have continued to shift away from rural areas to more concentrated urban and suburban areas, with about three-fourths of Cubans living in cities.170 With this shift in population has also come a shift in the country’s agricultural system. As of 2007, about 15% of all agriculture in Cuba could be classified as urban agriculture.171 Not only have agricultural practices changed, but eating habits have as well. Without the Soviet Union to provide a ready source of income and the machinery needed to engage in large-scale livestock production, vegetable consumption has increased dramat-ically.172 Nearly every urban area has direct access to a wide variety of locally grown, organic produce.173 Many of the urban farms in Cuba, including the Vivero Alamar, make use of organoponics, a system where crops are produced in raised beds of soil on land that would otherwise be incapable of supporting intensive agricultural pro-duction.174 Many of these raised beds can be constructed in a concentrated area to support a wide variety of produce, with the typical organoponic garden covering anywhere from one half to several hectares in size.175 The rise of the organoponic production method was a shift away from the earlier centralized production mod-el employed by the state. It has been supported through intensive research and development by a variety of state agencies, such as the National Institute of Agri-cultural Science, and continued development has been guided through intensive training and educational programs.176 The organoponic system is not limited in its application to Cuban urban farms, but **maintains potential to be applied worldwide**, including in the United States. Urban agriculture in Cuba revitalized and put to use previously aban-doned and unused land. A similar approach could be applied to the United States as a means to restore blighted areas.177 Applying Cuban-derived organoponics in U.S. cities could potentially open up an enormous amount of land that was previ-ously unusable. From a business perspective, investing in an organoponic agri-cultural program in the United States is also a sound decision since the demand for local produce reached $4.8 billion in 2008 and is only expected to grow fur-ther, potentially reaching $7 billion in 2012. In an American city beset with high unemployment such as Detroit, Michigan, for example, investing in urban agriculture could potentially generate as many as five thousand new jobs.179 By utilizing Cuba’s system of organopon-ics, the need to use expensive and complex farm machinery could be significantly reduced. Already companies in the United States, such as Farmscape Gardens in southern California, recognize what Cuba’s organoponic system could achieve and have integrated it into their business practices.180 Rachel Bailin, a partner in the company, indicated that it was Cuba’s organic farming practices that helped inspire them to start a company devoted to urban agriculture.181 They have al-ready used Cuba’s organoponic farming methods to produce more than 50,000 pounds of produce since the spring of 2009.182 **The potential for future growth in this industry is huge**, as Farmscape Gardens’ current levels of production make it the largest urban agriculture company in the state of California.183Cuba not only offers attractive prospects for trading in the future, but methods of agriculture pioneered out of necessity have broad prospects if applied to agriculture in the United States. As the demand for locally grown produce continues to increase, a cost-effective and proven agricultural model like Cuba’s organoponic system may be just what is needed to allow for urban agriculture to flourish. VII. CONCLUSIONS The United States and Cuba have a long, complicated history that years of animosity and finger pointing have certainly done little to improve. For more than fifty years now, the United States has shunned one of its closest neighbors, but recent actions by the Obama administration indicate change is certainly a possibility. In conclusion, the future of trade relations with Cuba can be summed up as follows: First, truly open trade with Cuba is not likely to occur for many years. The political and foreign policy practices that have supported the embargo will not disappear overnight. What is more likely, though, is a continued and gradual relaxation of certain trade policies that will ultimately benefit a number of U.S. industries, agriculture included. While trade in agricultural products is currently possible on a limited scale, agricultural entities in the United States interested in trading with Cuba on a larger scale should begin their preparations now by forg-ing relationships with their Cuban counterparts. Opening the door to further trade will not happen without a concentrated and prolonged push by various in-terest groups in the United States. Second, certain companies that wish to do business in Cuba today are able to do so and should begin familiarizing themselves with the Cuban govern-mental entities such as Alimport. Barring a complete reorganization of the Cu-ban government, agencies such as Alimport will likely continue to oversee for-eign trade for the foreseeable future. Forming business relationships with Cuban companies in the short-term under existing regulations will help support broader trade opportunities in the future. Finally, what Cuba has accomplished in the field of cooperative and ur-ban agricultural products is remarkable, and should serve as an inspiration to farmers and businesses in the United States as well. The Cuban organoponic system of production has great potential for a variety of urban and suburban farming activities in the United States, particularly as demand for local and or-ganic produce continues to rise. As relations between Cuba and the United States continue to thaw in the coming years, organizations that began their preparations today will be best equipped to meet the challenges and opportunities posed by this new and grow-ing market. Political animosities will eventually crumble in the face of the eco-nomic opportunities that closer trade relations could bring to both nations. One of the United States’ closest neighbors has been its enemy for far too long. Cuba presents a unique opportunity American business and agricultural enterprises cannot afford to overlook.

#### Access to the US market is critical to *sustainability* and *emulation*

Kost 04 – William is part of the Economic Research Service for the USDA. (“CUBAN AGRICULTURE: TO BE OR NOT TO BE ORGANIC?” 2004, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume14/pdfs/kost.pdf)

MARKETS MAY BE CRITICAL FOR AN ORGANIC CUBA In addition to the above European markets, the successful expansion and viability of Cuba’s organic production may also depend on access to geographically close, high-income foreign markets, namely the United States and Canada. Currently, Cuban produce is not certified-organic in either of these markets. Only after Cuban products are certified for these countries could Cuba legally export produce labeled organic to these markets. Given that many technical production practices currently followed by Cuban producers are potentially compatible with U.S. certification standards and given Cuba’s prior experience in becoming Swiss-certified, Cuba could be well positioned to meet U.S. certification standards. For the U.S. organic market, in addition to a lifting of the U.S. embargo, Cuba would have to be certified by a USDA-accredited certification program that assures U.S. markets that Cuban products labeled organic meet all National Organic Program standards and regulations under the U.S. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990. If the U.S. embargo on Cuba were lifted, Cuban exports, once certified, could play a significant role in the U.S. organic market. In this current U.S. niche market, production costs are high. Opening the U.S. market would enable Cuba to exploit its significant **comparative advantage** in this area. This market could become a quick foreign exchange earner for Cuba. The largest barrier Cuba faces in expanding into the U.S. organic market will be meeting U.S. requirements for organic certification. Tapping the U.S. market may create sufficient price incentives for Cuban producers to take the necessary steps to meet the organic standards of other importing countries. Cuba could then expand production of organic produce geared to these specialty export markets. With sufficiently high prices for organic produce, urban labor may remain active in an organic urban gardening sector. Most likely, the viability of a vibrant organic produce production and processing sector in Cuba will depend on Cuba’s gaining access to the large, nearby U.S. market. Without such access, organic-oriented production of horticultural products in Cuba will likely remain a necessity-driven way to produce food for domestic consumption in an environment where other production approaches are just not available. The U.S. market is large and diverse. The demand for organic produce is only one portion of that market. How Cuba’s horticultural industry responds to restored U.S. trade will be a function of the relative price and cost incentives of the organic and non-organic market segments. If the organic price premiums are sufficient, Cuba has the climate, land resources, low-cost labor, and history of organicoriented production to allow it to develop and grow its horticultural sector in that direction. If the market incentives are not sufficiently large to pursue the organic produce market, Cuba will return to a chemical- and technology-driven, yield-maximizing, and labor-minimizing commercial production as rapidly as they can afford to do so. Cuba will have some incentive to increase domestic food production as rapidly as possible to feed the domestic population, rather than importing food for domestic consumption. Cuba could then use a larger share of its scarce foreign exchange to import energy, technology, and other inputs to support growth in other sectors of the Cuban economy.

#### Continued reliance on industrial mechanized ag results in *catastrophic warming* and *biodiversity loss*

Cummins 10 – Ronnie is the International Director of the Organic Consumers Association. (“Industrial Agriculture and Human Survival: The Road Beyond 10/10/10”, Organic Consumer’s Association, October 7, 2010, <http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_21747.cfm>)

Although transportation, industry, and energy producers are obviously major fossil fuel users and greenhouse gas polluters, not enough people understand that the worst U.S. and global greenhouse gas emitter is "Food Incorporated," transnational industrial food and farming, of which Monsanto and GMOs constitute a major part. Industrial farming, including 173 million acres of GE soybeans, corn, cotton, canola, and sugar beets, accounts for at least 35% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions (EPA's ridiculously low estimates range from 7% to 12%, while some climate scientists feel the figure could be as high as 50% or more). Industrial agriculture, biofuels, and non-sustainable cattle grazing - including cutting down the last remaining tropical rainforests in Latin America and Asia for GMO and chemical-intensive animal feed and biofuels - are also the main driving forces in **global deforestation and wetlands destruction**, which generate an additional 20% of all climate destabilizing GHGs. In other words the direct (food, fiber, and biofuels production, food processing, food distribution) and indirect damage (deforestation and destruction of wetlands) of industrial agriculture, GMOs, and the food industry are the major cause of global warming. Unless we take down Monsanto and Food Inc. and make the Great Transition to a relocalized system of organic food and farming, we and our children are doomed to reside in Climate Hell. Overall 78% of climate destabilizing greenhouse gases come from CO2, while the remainder come from methane, nitrous oxide, and black carbon or soot. To stabilize the climate we will need to drastically reduce all of these greenhouse gas emissions, not just CO2, and sequester twice as much carbon matter in the soil (through organic farming and ranching, and forest and wetlands restoration) as we are doing presently. Currently GMO and industrial/factory farms (energy and chemical-intensive) farms emit at least 25% of the carbon dioxide (mostly from tractors, trucks, combines, transportation, cooling, freezing, and heating); 40% of the methane (mostly from massive herds of animals belching and farting, and manure ponds); and 96% of nitrous oxide (mostly from synthetic fertilizer manufacture and use, the millions of tons of animal manure from factory-farmed cattle herds, pig and poultry flocks, and millions of tons of sewage sludge spread on farms). Black carbon or soot comes primarily from older diesel engines, slash and burn agriculture, and wood cook stoves. Per ton, methane is 21 times more damaging, and nitrous oxide 310 times more damaging, as a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, when measured over a one hundred year period. Damage is even worse if you look at the impact on global warming over the next crucial 20-year period. Many climate scientists admit that they have previously drastically underestimated the dangers of the non-CO2 GHGs, including methane, soot, and nitrous oxide, which are responsible for at least 22% of global warming.

#### A move towards organic ag mitigates future emissions and prevents warming

Scialabba 10 – Nadia is from the Natural Resources Management and Environment Department, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (“Organic agriculture and climate change”, February 2, 2010, Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems 25.2, <http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/275960/al185e.pdf>)

Organic agricultural systems have an inherent potential to both reduce GHG emissions and to enhance carbon sequestration in the soil (Table 1). An important potential contribution of organically managed systems is the careful management of nutrients, and hence the reduction of N2 O emissions from soils, which are the most relevant single source of direct GHG emissions from agriculture. More research is needed to quantify and improve the effects of organic paddy rice production and to develop strategies to reduce methane emissions from enteric fermentation (e.g., by promoting double-use breeds). Indirect GHG emissions are reduced in organic systems by avoidance of mineral fertilizers. With the current organic consumers’ demand, further emission reductions are expected when organic standards include speciﬁc climate standards that consider, inter alia, reduced energy consumption in the organic food chain (e.g., limitations on greenhouse heating/cooling, processing and packaging, food miles combined with life cycle assessment). The advantage of organic systems is that they are driven by aware consumers and that they already carry a guarantee system of veriﬁcation and labeling which is consonant with climate labeling113 . The highest mitigation potential of organic agriculture lies in carbon sequestration in soils and in reduced clearing of primary ecosystems. The total amount of mitigation is difﬁcult to quantify, because it is highly dependent on local environmental conditions and management practices. Should all agricultural systems be managed organically, the omission of mineral fertilizer production and application is estimated to reduce the agricultural GHG emissions by about 20% — 10% caused by reduced N2 O emissions and about 10% by lower energy demand. These avoided emissions are supplemented by an emission compensation potential through carbon sequestration in croplands and grasslands of about 40–72% of the current annual agricultural GHG emissions76. However, further research is needed to conﬁrm these ﬁgures, as long-term scientiﬁc studies are limited and do not apply to different kinds of soils, climates and practices. To date, most of the research on the mitigation potential of agricultural practices has been carried out in developed countries; dedicated investigations are needed to assess and understand the mitigation potential in tropical and subtropical areas and under the predominant management practices of developing countries. More importantly, the adaptation aspects of organic agricultural practices must be the focus of public policies and research. One of the main effects of climate change is an increase of uncertainties, both for weather events and global food markets. Organic agriculture has a strong potential for building resilience in the face of climate variability (Table 2). The total abstention from synthetic inputs in organic agriculture has been a strong incentive to develop agricultural management practices that optimize the natural production potential of speciﬁc agro-ecosystems, based on traditional knowledge and modern research. These strategies can be used to enhance agricultural communities that have no access to purchased inputs, which is the case of the majority of the rural poor. The main organic strategies are diversiﬁcation and an increase of soil organic matter, which both could enhance resilience against extreme weather events and are recommended by the IPCC. These strategies have, in particular, a high potential to enhance the productivity of degraded soils, especially in marginal areas, while enhancing soil carbon sequestration. The adaptive approach inherent to organic agriculture offers simultaneous climate mitigation beneﬁts. Finally, certiﬁed organic products cater for higher income options for producers and hence a market-based incentive for environmental stewardship. The scaling-up of organic agriculture would promote and support climatefriendly farming practices worldwide. However, investments in research and development of organic agriculture are needed to better unlock its potential and application on a large scale.

#### Warming causes extinction and the threshold is soon

**Roberts 13** – citing the World Bank Review’s compilation of climate studies - 4 degree projected warming, can’t adapt - heat wave related deaths, forest fires, crop production, water wars, ocean acidity, sea level rise, climate migrants, biodiversity loss. ("If you aren’t alarmed about climate, you aren’t paying attention", January 10, 2013, [http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal](http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal/~~))

We know we’ve raised global average temperatures around 0.8 degrees C so far. We know that 2 degrees C is where most scientists predict catastrophic and irreversible impacts. And we know that we are currently on a trajectory that will push temperatures up 4 degrees or more by the end of the century. What would 4 degrees look like? A recent [World Bank review of the science](http://climatechange.worldbank.org/) reminds us. First, it’ll get hot: Projections for a 4°C world show a dramatic increase in the intensity and frequency of high-temperature extremes. Recent extreme heat waves such as in Russia in 2010 are likely to become the new normal summer in a 4°C world. Tropical South America, central Africa, and all tropical islands in the Pacific are likely to regularly experience heat waves of unprecedented magnitude and duration. In this new high-temperature climate regime, the coolest months are likely to be substantially warmer than the warmest months at the end of the 20th century. In regions such as the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Tibetan plateau, almost all summer months are likely to be warmer than the most extreme heat waves presently experienced. For example, the warmest July in the Mediterranean region could be 9°C warmer than today’s warmest July. Extreme heat waves in recent years have had severe impacts, causing heat-related deaths, forest fires, and harvest losses. The impacts of the extreme heat waves projected for a 4°C world have not been evaluated, but they could be expected to vastly exceed the consequences experienced to date and potentially **exceed the adaptive capacities of many societies and natural systems**. [my emphasis] Warming to 4 degrees would also lead to “an increase of about 150 percent in acidity of the ocean,” leading to levels of acidity “unparalleled in Earth’s history.” That’s bad news for, say, coral reefs: The combination of thermally induced bleaching events, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise threatens large fractions of coral reefs even at 1.5°C global warming. The regional extinction of entire coral reef ecosystems, which could occur well before 4°C is reached, would have profound consequences for their dependent species and for the people who depend on them for food, income, tourism, and shoreline protection. It will also “likely lead to a sea-level rise of 0.5 to 1 meter, and possibly more, by 2100, with several meters more to be realized in the coming centuries.” That rise won’t be spread evenly, even within regions and countries — regions close to the equator will see even higher seas. There are also indications that it would “significantly exacerbate existing water scarcity in many regions, particularly northern and eastern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, while additional countries in Africa would be newly confronted with water scarcity on a national scale due to population growth.” Also, more extreme weather events: Ecosystems will be affected by more frequent extreme weather events, such as forest loss due to droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion. In Amazonia, forest fires could as much as double by 2050 with warming of approximately 1.5°C to 2°C above preindustrial levels. Changes would be expected to be even more severe in a 4°C world. Also loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services: In a 4°C world, climate change seems likely to become the dominant driver of ecosystem shifts, surpassing habitat destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth’s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Ecosystem damage would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (for example, fisheries and protection of coastline afforded by coral reefs and mangroves.) New research also indicates a “rapidly rising risk of crop yield reductions as the world warms.” So food will be tough. All this will add up to “large-scale displacement of populations and have adverse consequences for human security and economic and trade systems.” Given the uncertainties and long-tail risks involved, “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible.” There’s a small but non-trivial chance of advanced civilization breaking down entirely. Now ponder the fact that some scenarios show us going up to 6degrees by the end of the century, a level of devastation we have not studied and barely know how to conceive. Ponder the fact that somewhere along the line, though we don’t know exactly where, enough self-reinforcing feedback loops will be running to make climate change unstoppable and irreversible for centuries to come. That would mean handing our grandchildren and their grandchildren not only a **burned, chaotic, denuded world**, but a world that is inexorably more inhospitable with every passing decade.

#### Warming is *real* and *anthropogenic*

Prothero 12 – Donald R. Prothero is a Professor of Geology at Occidental College and Lecturer in Geobiology at the California Institute of Technology. (“How We Know Global Warming is Real and Human Caused”, 3/1/2012, http://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/12-02-08/)

How do we know that global warming is real and primarily human caused? There are numerous lines of evidence that converge to this conclusion. Carbon Dioxide Increase. Carbon dioxide in our atmosphere has increased at an unprecedented rate in the past 200 years. Not one data set collected over a long enough span of time shows otherwise. Mann et al. (1999) compiled the past 900 years’ worth of temperature data from tree rings, ice cores, corals, and direct measurements of the past few centuries, and the sudden increase of temperature of the past century stands out like a sore thumb. This famous graph (see Figure 1 above) is now known as the “hockey stick” because it is long and straight through most of its length, then bends sharply upward at the end like the blade of a hockey stick. Other graphs show that climate was very stable within a narrow range of variation through the past 1000, 2000, or even 10,000 years since the end of the last Ice Age. There were minor warming events during the Climatic Optimum about 7000 years ago, the Medieval Warm Period, and the slight cooling of the Little Ice Age from the 1700s and 1800s. But the magnitude and rapidity of the warming represented by the last 200 years is simply unmatched in all of human history. More revealing, the timing of this warming coincides with the Industrial Revolution, when humans first began massive deforestation and released carbon dioxide by burning coal, gas, and oil.

Melting Polar Ice Caps. The polar icecaps are thinning and breaking up at an alarming rate. In 2000, my former graduate advisor Malcolm McKenna was one of the first humans to fly over the North Pole in summer time and see no ice, just open water. The Arctic ice cap has been frozen solid for at least the past 3 million years and maybe longer3, but now the entire ice sheet is breaking up so fast that by 2030 (and possibly sooner) less than half of the Arctic will be ice covered in the summer.4 As one can see from watching the news, this is an ecological disaster for everything that lives up there, from the polar bears to the seals and walruses to the animals they feed upon, to the 4 million people whose world is melting beneath their feet. The Antarctic is thawing even faster. In February–March 2002, the Larsen B ice shelf—over 3000 square km (the size of Rhode Island) and 220 m (700 feet) thick—broke up in just a few months, a story typical of nearly all the ice shelves in Antarctica. The Larsen B shelf had survived all the previous ice ages and interglacial warming episodes for the past 3 million years, and even the warmest periods of the last 10,000 years—yet it and nearly all the other thick ice sheets on the Arctic, Greenland, and Antarctic are vanishing at a rate never before seen in geologic history.

Melting Glaciers. Glaciers are all retreating at the highest rates ever documented. Many of those glaciers, especially in the Himalayas, Andes, Alps, and Sierras, provide most of the freshwater that the populations below the mountains depend upon—yet this fresh water supply is vanishing. Just think about the percentage of world’s population in southern Asia (especially India) that depend on Himalayan snowmelt for their fresh water. The implications are staggering. The permafrost that once remained solidly frozen even in the summer has now thawed, damaging the Inuit villages on the Arctic coast and threatening all our pipelines to the North Slope of Alaska. This is catastrophic not only for life on the permafrost, but as it thaws, the permafrost releases huge amounts of greenhouse gases and is one of the major contributors to global warming. Not only is the ice vanishing, but we have seen record heat waves over and over again, killing thousands of people, as each year joins the list of the hottest years on record. (2010 just topped that list as the hottest year, surpassing the previous record in 2009, and we shall know about 2011 soon enough). Natural animal and plant populations are being devastated all over the globe as their environment changes.5 Many animals respond by moving their ranges to formerly cold climates, so now places that once did not have to worry about disease-bearing mosquitoes are infested as the climate warms and allows them to breed further north.

Sea Level Rise. All that melted ice eventually ends up in the ocean, causing sea level to rise, as it has many times in the geologic past. At present, sea level is rising about 3–4 mm per year, more than ten times the rate of 0.1–0.2 mm/year that has occurred over the past 3000 years. Geological data show that sea level was virtually unchanged over the past 10,000 years since the present interglacial began. A few millimeters here or there doesn’t impress people, until you consider that the rate is accelerating and that most scientists predict sea level will rise 80–130 cm in just the next century. A sea level rise of 1.3 m (almost 4 feet) would drown many of the world’s low-elevation cities, such as Venice and New Orleans, and low-lying countries such as the Netherlands or Bangladesh. A number of tiny island nations such as Vanuatu and the Maldives, which barely poke out above the ocean now, are already vanishing beneath the waves. Eventually their entire population will have to move someplace else.6 Even a small sea level rise might not drown all these areas, but they are much more vulnerable to the large waves of a storm surge (as happened with Hurricane Katrina), which could do much more damage than sea level rise alone. If sea level rose by 6 m (20 feet), most of the world’s coastal plains and low-lying areas (such as the Louisiana bayous, Florida, and most of the world’s river deltas) would be drowned.

Most of the world’s population lives in coastal cities such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Miami, Shanghai, and London. All of those cities would be partially or completely under water with such a sea level rise. If all the glacial ice caps melted completely (as they have several times before during past greenhouse episodes in the geologic past), sea level would rise by 65 m (215 feet)! The entire Mississippi Valley would flood, so you could dock your boat in Cairo, Illinois. Such a sea level rise would drown nearly every coastal region under hundreds of feet of water, and inundate New York City, London and Paris. All that would remain would be the tall landmarks, such as the Empire State Building, Big Ben, and the Eiffel Tower. You could tie your boats to these pinnacles, but the rest of these drowned cities would be deep under water.

Climate Deniers’ Arguments and Scientists’ Rebuttals

Despite the overwhelming evidence there are many people who remain skeptical. One reason is that they have been fed lies, distortions, and misstatements by the global warming denialists who want to cloud or confuse the issue. Let’s examine some of these claims in detail:

“It’s just natural climatic variability.” No, it is not. As I detailed in my 2009 book, Greenhouse of the Dinosaurs, geologists and paleoclimatologists know a lot about past greenhouse worlds, and the icehouse planet that has existed for the past 33 million years. We have a good understanding of how and why the Antarctic ice sheet first appeared at that time, and how the Arctic froze over about 3.5 million years ago, beginning the 24 glacial and interglacial episodes of the “Ice Ages” that have occurred since then. We know how variations in the earth’s orbit (the Milankovitch cycles) controls the amount of solar radiation the earth receives, triggering the shifts between glacial and interglacial periods. Our current warm interglacial has already lasted 10,000 years, the duration of most previous interglacials, so if it were not for global warming, we would be headed into the next glacial in the next 1000 years or so. Instead, our pumping greenhouse gases into our atmosphere after they were long trapped in the earth’s crust has pushed the planet into a “super-interglacial,” already warmer than any previous warming period. We can see the “big picture” of climate variability most clearly in the EPICA cores from Antarctica (see Figure 2 below), which show the details of the last 650,000 years of glacial-interglacial cycles. At no time during any previous interglacial did the carbon dioxide levels exceed 300 ppm, even at their very warmest. Our atmospheric carbon dioxide levels are already close to 400 ppm today. The atmosphere is headed to 600 ppm within a few decades, even if we stopped releasing greenhouse gases immediately. This is decidedly not within the normal range of “climatic variability,” but clearly unprecedented in human history. Anyone who says this is “normal variability” has never seen the huge amount of paleoclimatic data that show otherwise. “It’s just another warming episode, like the Mediaeval Warm Period, or the Holocene Climatic Optimum” or the end of the Little Ice Age.” Untrue. There were numerous small fluctuations of warming and cooling over the last 10,000 years of the Holocene. But in the case of the Mediaeval Warm Period (about 950–1250 A.D.), the temperatures increased by only 1°C, much less than we have seen in the current episode of global warming (see Figure 1). This episode was also only a local warming in the North Atlantic and northern Europe. Global temperatures over this interval did not warm at all, and actually cooled by more than 1°C. Likewise, the warmest period of the last 10,000 years was the Holocene Climatic Optimum (5000–9000 B.C.) when warmer and wetter conditions in Eurasia caused the rise of the first great civilizations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, and China. This was largely a Northern Hemisphere-Eurasian phenomenon, with 2–3°C warming in the Arctic and northern Europe. But there was almost no warming in the tropics, and cooling or no change in the Southern Hemisphere.7 To the Eurocentric world, these warming events seemed important, but on a global scale the effect is negligible. In addition, neither of these warming episodes is related to increasing greenhouse gases. The Holocene Climatic Optimum, in fact, is predicted by the Milankovitch cycles, since at that time the axial tilt of the earth was 24°, its steepest value, meaning the Northern Hemisphere got more solar radiation than normal—but the Southern Hemisphere less, so the two balanced. By contrast, not only is the warming observed in the last 200 years much greater than during these previous episodes, but it is also global and bipolar, so it is not a purely local effect. The warming that ended the Little Ice Age (from the mid-1700s to the late 1800s) was due to increased solar radiation prior to 1940. Since 1940, however, the amount of solar radiation has been dropping, so the only candidate for the post-1940 warming has to be carbon dioxide.8

“It’s just the sun, or cosmic rays, or volcanic activity or methane.” **Nope**, sorry. The amount of heat that the sun provides has been decreasing since 19409, just the opposite of the denialists’ claims. There is no evidence (see Figure 3 below) of increase in cosmic radiation during the past century.10 Nor is there any clear evidence that large-scale volcanic events (such as the 1815 eruption of Tambora in Indonesia, which changed global climate for about a year) have any long-term effect that would explain 200 years of warming and carbon dioxide increase. Volcanoes erupt only 0.3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide each year, but humans emit over 29 billion tonnes a year11, roughly 100 times as much. Clearly, we have a bigger effect. Methane is a more powerful greenhouse gas, but there is 200 times more carbon dioxide than methane, so carbon dioxide is still the most important agent.12 Every other alternative has been looked at, but the only clear-cut relationship is between human-caused carbon dioxide increase and global warming. “The climate records since 1995 (or 1998) show cooling.” That’s a deliberate deception. People who throw this argument out are cherry-picking the data.13 Over the short term, there was a slight cooling trend from 1998–2000 (see Figure 4 below), because 1998 was a record-breaking El Niño year, so the next few years look cooler by comparison. But since 2002, the overall long-term trend of warming is unequivocal. This statement is a clear-cut case of using out-of-context data in an attempt to deny reality. All of the 16 hottest years ever recorded on a global scale have occurred in the last 20 years. They are (in order of hottest first): 2010, 2009, 1998, 2005, 2003, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2001, 1997, 2008, 1995, 1999, 1990, and 2000.14 In other words, every year since 2000 has been in the Top Ten hottest years list, and the rest of the list includes 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. Only 1996 failed to make the list (because of the short-term cooling mentioned already).

“We had record snows in the winters of 2009–2010, and in 2010–2011.” So what? This is nothing more than the difference between weather (short-term seasonal changes) and climate (the long-term average of weather over decades and centuries and longer). Our local weather tells us nothing about another continent, or the global average; it is only a local effect, determined by short-term atmospheric and oceanographic conditions.15 In fact, warmer global temperatures mean more moisture in the atmosphere, which increases the intensity of normal winter snowstorms. In this particular case, the climate denialists forget that the early winter of November–December 2009 was actually very mild and warm, and then only later in January and February did it get cold and snow heavily. That warm spell in early winter helped bring more moisture into the system, so that when cold weather occurred, the snows were worse. In addition, the snows were unusually heavy only in North America; the rest of the world had different weather, and the global climate was warmer than average. And the summer of 2010 was the hottest on record, breaking the previous record set in 2009.

“Carbon dioxide is good for plants, so the world will be better off.” Who do they think they’re kidding? The people who promote this idea clearly don’t know much global geochemistry, or are trying to cynically take advantage of the fact that most people are ignorant of science. The Competitive Enterprise Institute (funded by oil and coal companies and conservative foundations16) has run a series of shockingly stupid ads concluding with the tag line “Carbon dioxide: they call it pollution, we call it life.” Anyone who knows the basic science of earth’s atmosphere can spot the deceptions in this ad.17 Sure, plants take in carbon dioxide that animals exhale, as they have for millions of years. But the whole point of the global warming evidence (as shown from ice cores) is that the delicate natural balance of carbon dioxide has been thrown out of whack by our production of too much of it, way in excess of what plants or the oceans can handle. As a consequence, the oceans are warming18 and absorbing excess carbon dioxide making them more acidic. Already we are seeing a shocking decline in coral reefs (“bleaching”) and extinctions in many marine ecosystems that can’t handle too much of a good thing. Meanwhile, humans are busy cutting down huge areas of temperate and tropical forests, which not only means there are fewer plants to absorb the gas, but the slash and burn practices are releasing more carbon dioxide than plants can keep up with. There is much debate as to whether increased carbon dioxide might help agriculture in some parts of the world, but that has to be measured against the fact that other traditional “breadbasket” regions (such as the American Great Plains) are expected to get too hot to be as productive as they are today. The latest research19 actually shows that increased carbon dioxide inhibits the absorption of nitrogen into plants, so plants (at least those that we depend upon today) are not going to flourish in a greenhouse world. Anyone who tells you otherwise is ignorant of basic atmospheric science.

“I agree that climate is changing, but I’m skeptical that humans are the main cause, so we shouldn’t do anything.” This is just fence sitting. A lot of reasonable skeptics deplore the “climate denialism” of the right wing, but still want to be skeptical about the cause. If they want proof, they can examine the huge array of data that directly points to humans causing global warming.20 We can directly measure the amount of carbon dioxide humans are producing, and it tracks exactly with the amount of increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide. Through carbon isotope analysis, we can show that this carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is coming directly from our burning of fossil fuels, not from natural sources. We can also measure oxygen levels that drop as we produce more carbon that then combines with oxygen to produce carbon dioxide. We have satellites in space that are measuring the heat released from the planet and can actually see the atmosphere get warmer. The most crucial proof emerged only in the past few years: climate models of the greenhouse effect predict that there should be cooling in the stratosphere (the upper layer of the atmosphere above 10 km (6 miles) in elevation, but warming in the troposphere (the bottom layer of the atmosphere below 10 km (6 miles), and that’s exactly what our space probes have measured. Finally, we can rule out any other culprits (see above): solar heat is decreasing since 1940, not increasing, and there are no measurable increases in cosmic radiation, methane, volcanic gases, or any other potential cause. Face it—it’s our problem.

Why Do People Deny Climate Change? Thanks to all the noise and confusion over the debate, the general public has only a vague idea of what the debate is really about, and only about half of Americans think global warming is real or that we are to blame.21 As in the debate over evolution and creationism, the scientific community is virtually unanimous on what the data demonstrate about anthropogenic global warming. This has been true for over a decade. When science historian Naomi Oreskes surveyed all peer-reviewed papers on climate change published between 1993 and 2003 in the world’s leading scientific journal, Science, she found that there were 980 supporting the idea of human-induced global warming and none opposing it. In 2009, Doran and Kendall Zimmerman23 surveyed all the climate scientists who were familiar with the data. They found that 95–99% agreed that global warming is real and that humans are the reason. In 2010, the prestigious Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences published a study that showed that 98% of the scientists who actually do research in climate change are in agreement with anthropogenic global warming.24 Every major scientific organization in the world has endorsed the conclusion of anthropogenic climate change as well. This is a rare degree of agreement within such an independent and cantankerous group as the world’s top scientists. This is the same degree of scientific consensus that scientists have achieved over most major ideas, including gravity, evolution, and relativity. These and only a few other topics in science can claim this degree of agreement among nearly all the world’s leading scientists, especially among everyone who is close to the scientific data and knows the problem intimately. If it were not such a controversial topic politically, there would be almost no interest in debating it, since the evidence is so clear-cut. If the climate science community speaks with one voice (as in the 2007 IPCC report, and every report since then), why is there still any debate at all? The answer has been revealed by a number of investigations by diligent reporters who got past the PR machinery denying global warming, and uncovered the money trail. Originally, there was no real “dissenters” to the idea of global warming by scientists who are actually involved with climate research. Instead, the forces with vested interests in denying global climate change (the energy companies, and the “free-market” advocates) followed the strategy of tobacco companies: create a smokescreen of confusion and prevent the American public from recognizing scientific consensus. As the famous memo25 from the tobacco lobbyists said “Doubt is our product.” The denialists generated an anti-science movement entirely out of thin air and PR. The evidence for this PR conspiracy has been well documented in numerous sources. For example, Oreskes and Conway revealed from memos leaked to the press that in April 1998 the right-wing Marshall Institute, SEPP (Fred Seitz’s lobby that aids tobacco companies and polluters), and ExxonMobil, met in secret at the American Petroleum Institute’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. There they planned a $20 million campaign to get “respected scientists” to cast doubt on climate change, get major PR efforts going, and lobby Congress that global warming isn’t real and is not a threat.

### 1AC—Plan Text

#### **The United States federal government should allow normal trade between the United States and Cuba.**

### 1AC—No War

#### Contention 3 is No war:

#### First, won’t happen—global institutions, interdependence, the internet, fiscal constraints and nuclear deterrence

**Robb 2012** (Doug, Lieutenant in the US Navy, “Now Hear This - Why the Age of Great-Power War Is Over” http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-05/now-hear-why-age-great-power-war-over)

In Proceedings’ April “Now Hear This,” Navy Lieutenant Commander Rachel Gosnell and Marine Second Lieutenant Michael Orzetti argue that “the possibility of great-power war [between the United States and China] cannot be ruled out.” However, despite China’s rise, which potentially threatens to alter international polarity, a preponderance of evidence suggests that the era of conventional large-scale war may be behind us.

For the purposes of my argument, the United States and China are defined as “great powers” because they have stable governments and large populations; influential economies and access to raw materials; professional militaries and a nuclear arsenal. Prussian war theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s “trinity,” which characterizes the interrelationship between the government (politics), people (society and the economy), and the military (in modern terms, deterrence and security), is useful to frame this debate.

The 20th century brought seismic shifts as the global political system transitioned from being multipolar during the first 40 years to bipolar during the Cold War before emerging as the American-led, unipolar international order we know today. These changes notwithstanding, major world powers have been at peace for nearly seven decades—the longest such period since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia codified the sovereign nation-state.

Whereas in years past, when nations allied with their neighbors in ephemeral bonds of convenience, today’s global politics are tempered by permanent international organizations, regional military alliances, and formal economic partnerships. Thanks in large part to the prevalence of liberal democracies, these groups are able to moderate international disputes and provide forums for nations to air grievances, assuage security concerns, and negotiate settlements—thereby making war a distant (and distasteful) option. As a result, China (and any other global power) has much to lose by flouting international opinion, as evidenced by its advocacy of the recent Syrian uprising, which has drawn widespread condemnation.

In addition to geopolitical and diplomacy issues, globalization continues to transform the world. This interdependence has blurred the lines between economic security and physical security. Increasingly, great-power interests demand cooperation rather than conflict. To that end, maritime nations such as the United States and China desire open sea lines of communication and protected trade routes, a common security challenge that could bring these powers together, rather than drive them apart (witness China’s response to the issue of piracy in its backyard). Facing these security tasks cooperatively is both mutually advantageous and common sense.

Democratic Peace Theory—championed by Thomas Paine and international relations theorists such as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman—presumes that great-power war will likely occur between a democratic and non-democratic state. However, as information flows freely and people find outlets for and access to new ideas, authoritarian leaders will find it harder to cultivate popular support for total war—an argument advanced by philosopher Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace.”

Consider, for example, China’s unceasing attempts to control Internet access. The 2011 Arab Spring demonstrated that organized opposition to unpopular despotic rule has begun to reshape the political order, a change galvanized largely by social media. Moreover, few would argue that China today is not socially more liberal, economically more capitalistic, and governmentally more inclusive than during Mao Tse-tung’s regime. As these trends continue, nations will find large-scale conflict increasingly disagreeable.

In terms of the military, ongoing fiscal constraints and socio-economic problems likely will marginalize defense issues. All the more reason why great powers will find it mutually beneficial to work together to find solutions to common security problems, such as countering drug smuggling, piracy, climate change, human trafficking, and terrorism—missions that Admiral Robert F. Willard, former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, called “deterrence and reassurance.”

As the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a formidable deterrent against unlimited war. They make conflict irrational; in other words, the concept of mutually assured destruction—however unpalatable—actually had a stabilizing effect on both national behaviors and nuclear policies for decades. These tools thus render great-power war infinitely less likely by guaranteeing catastrophic results for both sides. As Bob Dylan warned, “When you ain’t got nothing, you ain’t got nothing to lose.”

Great-power war is not an end in itself, but rather a way for nations to achieve their strategic aims. In the current security environment, such a war is equal parts costly, counterproductive, archaic, and improbable.

#### Second, nuclear taboo prevents use

**Perkovich 2009** (George Perkovich served as a speechwriter and foreign policy adviser to Senator Joe Biden from 1989 to 1990. Perkovich is an adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy. “EXTENDED DETERRENCE ON THE WAY TO A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD” http://icnnd.org/Documents/Perkovich\_Deterrence.pdf)

The reality today is that the taboo against using nuclear weapons has become so strong, especially in democracies, that the only threat against which it is justifiable and therefore credible to use these weapons is one where the survival of the U.S. or an ally is clearly jeopardized. Yet, with the possible exception of North Korea whose leadership could be imagined to use nuclear weapons against Japan or South Korea if its own survival were threatened, no other state poses a realistic threat to the national survival of U.S. allies in Europe or East Asia. Russia does not have the intention or capability to sustain an invasion of the new NATO states, let alone threaten their survival. Russia could destroy any state with its nuclear weapons, but because this, more than any other action, would practically guarantee nuclear retaliation, Russia would not run the risk. There is simply nothing important enough that Russia would want in any of the NATO states to merit such risk taking. China has no interest and inadequate capabilities to take mainland Japanese territory or otherwise threaten it militarily. It might pose military threats to Japanese positions regarding southern islands, but the U.S. and China are not going to wage nuclear war over such islands, and Japanese officials and public cannot realistically expect nuclear deterrence to operate here. Beijing does continue to increase its capabilities to deter Taiwan from declaring independence and the U.S. from defending Taiwan in such a scenario, but the surety of U.S. security assurances to Taiwan would be greater, not less, if neither China nor the U.S. possessed nuclear weapons. For the foreseeable future China would be highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons on Taiwanese targets, as the Chinese goal is to integrate Taiwanese into China, not to kill them. China would wish to deter U.S. intervention by threatening the American fleet, perhaps with nuclear weapons, and then deterring U.S. escalation against the Chinese homeland, by holding U.S. cities at risk. But the trigger of nuclear use in these scenarios would be a move by Taiwan to achieve independence. The U.S. has no obligation to fight for Taiwanese independence if China has not committed aggression against Taiwan first.

#### Third, it doesn’t cause extinction

**ROBOCK 2010** (Alan, Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, “Nuclear Winter,” WIREs Climate Change, May/June, Wiley Online Library via University of Michigan Libraries)

While it is important to point out the consequences of nuclear winter, it is also important to point out what will **not** be the consequences. Although extinction of our species was not ruled out in initial studies by biologists, it **now seems** that this **would not take place**. Especially in Australia and New Zealand, humans would have a better chance to survive. Also, Earth will not be plunged into an ice age. Ice sheets, which covered North America and Europe only 18,000 years ago and were more than 3-km thick, take many thousands of years to build up from annual snow layers, and the climatic disruptions would not last long enough to produce them. The oxygen consumption by the fires would be inconsequential, as would the effect on the atmospheric greenhouse by carbon dioxide production. The consequences of nuclear winter are extreme enough without these additional effects, however.

## 2AC

### 2AC—Must Be Conditional

#### Counterinterpretation—engagement must be unconditional

Smith 5 — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23)

First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19 ‘Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings. In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy.

#### Our interpretation is key to aff ground—solvency advocates only exist for 2 or 3 QPQ affs and they’re all terrible and solved by the unconditional counterplan—the literature base for unconditional Cuba affs is huge and critical to aff innovation which turns their ground claims

#### Limits are offense for us—their interpretation multiplies the topic by all the possible actions to condition each unconditional aff on

#### Default to reasonability—competing interpretations create a moral hazard that incentivizes going for T to arbitrarily limit out the aff instead of making debates better

### 2AC—Afropessimism

#### Their civil society links are wrong- black positionality and civil society aren’t always already defined by antagonism. The idea that civil society is corrupt ignores black agency throughout history

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While progress was significantly slower in the Deep South, the Jeanes teachers there still promoted centralization and networks that could open opportunities for participation in policy development. A state network of Georgia Jeanes teachers issued monthly reports in order to share accomplishments and news with other teachers across the state, but also with the state division and with philanthropic agents, and the teacher in Dooley reported that a district teachers’ association meeting was held with representatives from seven counties present.115 In 1935, Helen Whiting was appointed the Georgia State Supervisor of Colored Elementary Schools in the Division of Negro Education, and began to administer reading achievement tests throughout the state by the end of her first year.116 She issued regular “itinerary reports” about her work in the field, including suggestions to teachers that would promote centralization, such as adopting the State Reading Program in counties and seeking assistance from the county supervisor.117 The Georgia state agent, reflecting upon a decade of progress, noted that “the State Agents for Negro Schools, unlike the other state school supervisors, are free to move in and out among both white and Negro groups without considering the political implications of every step taken . . . the counties in Georgia now provide secondary schools for Negroes at public expense . . ., [which] has been accomplished by visiting the various counties and outlining a program with the stimulus of state and philanthropic funds.”118 Much credit has been given to the black churches in the South for their role in community organizing, and where the church was administratively part of a broader national or state organization, it could have a profound role in connecting the community outward. However, the schools also had this ability through their connection to northern philanthropists, state and local political systems, and, as an institution that was largely ignored, as a site for mobilization. Teachers there were able to encourage institutional innovation at the local level. As society became more interdependent, this was a crucial link to the social and political structure that disenfranchisement kept out of reach, and an important institutional site for participating in the development of policy. Jackson Davis, acting as field agent for the GEB, was asked to describe the accomplishments of the Jeanes teachers. “They succeeded in organizing the people into school community associations and bringing to bear the united sentiment of the community in favor of better school buildings, longer terms and more practical work in the schools by introducing simple industries. . . . The schools lost their isolation.”119 Public-private collaboration was essential to education development in the South and ultimately resulted in a stronger centralized school system. The [End Page 346] concept of “agency” can be defined along a continuum that includes anything from subtle forms of resistance to group insurgency.120 However, black teachers were able to engage with collaborative relationships, and in doing so exercised agency more broadly defined, helped to establish centralized administrative capacity in the lower tiers of government, and undermined the strength of sectional interests. It is not possible truly to understand black agency in the South without understanding the institutional venues in which it operated. Schooling helped to make political opportunity structures more permeable. In addition to people like Annie Holland and Helen Whiting, public-private collaboration and centralization also provided venues for blacks like W. T. B. Williams, who served as a field agent for the Jeanes Fund, and Hollis Frissel as principal of the Tuskegee Institute, to have significant influence on policy decision that affected rural communities. The actions of individual reformers were important, but it is essential also to understand the broader dynamic of interest groups and institutions that challenged the political structure. Schooling provided an institutional venue for rural blacks to mobilize, and it should be placed more centrally in the reform dynamic as an early institutional site for the mobilization of blacks. Rural black reformers recognized the value of promoting an education system not just as an end in itself, especially given the value placed on it as the antithesis to slavery, but also as a means to create avenues for greater participation in the political and social structure. They participated in the expansion of government at the local level through their efforts to create organizational capacity, and promoted voluntary organizations that created a common culture within and beyond local communities and broadened frames of support for their own agenda.121 In this regard, both conceptually and institutionally, “education” became the central meeting point for reformers, and the place in which organizational forms, parallel structures, and new identities were created ultimately to overcome southern opposition to educational advancement. Both of these ideals converged in the form of schooling, which became a unifying organizational venue. Local school-based organizations became central to the creation of a more bureaucratic state by facilitating the institutionalism of reforms at the local level and providing links to policy initiatives that emerged from philanthropists and their agents outside the community. It would be overstating it to make the claim that the black community mobilized between 1909 and 1935 as an organized interest group in the South, or to claim that it had a formally defined role in policy development. However, education reformers were able to mobilize the community through [End Page 347] schooling in a more organized manner than has been recognized. Schools helped to promote expanding political opportunities, organizational strength, and shared cognitions in the community.122 The black community, especially through the work of the Jeanes teachers, was able to utilize the organizational repertoires of schooling to connect local institutions to the political structures outside rural communities, creating political innovation and promoting reform. Southern blacks did indeed have an instrument for constructing new collective identities; schooling served as a link to alternative models of political organization and participation far earlier than what has typically been attributed to the community. Through schools, teachers were able to exploit and even initiate the public-private collaborations that developed between philanthropists and state and local governments in order to institutionalize reforms, especially through state centralization. The insurgency that developed in later decades is indebted to the organizational structures and community mobilization that occurred through schooling.

#### The 1AC’s description of the world is based on data, empirics, and statistics, which should be the framework for weighing arguments—only our theories are falsifiable and can be endorsed with confidence

#### The slave is not socially dead—life can always improve – their kritik is totalizing and unsustainable

Culbertson 10 (Laura Culbertson, "Slaves and Households in the Near East", The University of Chicago Oriental Institute Seminars, Number 7, oi.uchicago.edu/pdf/ois7.pdf)

The concept of social death is not without criticism, however, much of which rejects the totalizing, abstract, or generalizing nature of the concept or notes the unsustainability of this definition when affixed to specific historical or political contexts, including those of the New World. As the ensuing chapters in this volume demonstrate, enslaved people in Near Eastern contexts could engage in social maneuvering and hierarchal ascension even within the confines of slavery and cannot be considered socially dead or dispossessed. Moreover, slave status could be terminated or transformed through a variety of mechanisms (e.g., payments, court proceedings, religious conversion), meaning that the formerly enslaved could return to their homes and families, not permanently displaced from their original social networks or birth entitlements as a result of becoming a slave.

#### Conditionality

#### Everyone will always have a value to their lives and the neg essentializes them

Amien **Kacou 8** WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: **there is pleasure in all consciousness** of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, **it is simply the very experience of liking things**, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, **there are many things the experience of which we like**. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, **what they are is irrelevant** in an inquiry on **a priori value**—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation.

Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and **only in living**, therefore, **a priori**, life ought to be **continuously (and indefinitely) pursued** at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.

However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that **life has some objective value**. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (**subjective) desire for life** shows life to have some (**objective) value**. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### The affirmative should win if the results of the imagined policy action are good

#### Any other interpretation moots 8 minutes of the 1AC and makes it impossible to get stable offense against the status quo or the kritik which internal link turns their education arguments

#### Perm do both

#### The perm applies the lessons of the past to the problems of the present

Axtell 93 James Axtell, Kenan Professor of Humanities at the College of William and Mary, chaired the American Historical Association's Columbus Quincentenary Committee, Historian, Autumn, Vol. 56, Issue 1 1993

We judge the past for at least three important reasons. The first is to appraise action, an intrinsic part of historical thinking. Not to make such judgments is to abandon the past to itself, rendering it unintelligible and untranslatable to the present. The second reason is to do justice to it, although making judgment is not the same as passing sentence. As historians, we are too involved in both the prosecution and the defense since the words and reputations of the dead on all sides are in our hands. History's goal is not to punish or rehabilitate historical malefactors, who are morally incorrigible in any event, but to set the record straight for future appeals to precedent. The third reason for judging the past is to advance our own moral education, to learn from and, in effect, to be judged by the past. Since we think and speak historically for our own generation, we can have judgmental effect only on ourselves. Consequently, history becomes, in Lord Bolingbroke's famous phrase, "philosophy teaching by example," a "preceptor of prudence, not of principles." After bearing witness to the past with all the disinterestedness and human empathy we can muster, we should let ourselves be judged by the past as much as, or more than, we judge it The past is filled with the lives and struggles of countless "others," from whom we may learn to extend the possibilities of our own limited humanity. As we learn about what it is like to be other than ourselves, we are better able to do justice to the past.[14]¶ The relationship between the past and the present is always troubled and troubling. Historians cannot help but draw on the past for materials, methods, and models. Our self-images and sodal foundations are fabricated from historical elements, all inherited but reshaped by our current needs and biases, and then rewoven by our flawed and fluid memories. We need the past to give us bearings, but we often construct pasts that are merely useful and undemanding, more wishful than true. This leads to serious problems for historians because we cannot cure inherited social ills or make moral amends for past wrongs unless we know how the past actually was. It is perhaps the profession's most important task to ensure that our image of the past is as nearly full, complex, and true as the past itself was, lest we lose our bearings in fantasy and waste our resources and moral energies on false trails.

#### The alt does nothing—the government will still exist and it’s hjardder to burn down society than you think

### 2AC—Restitution CP

#### Cuba says no

Travieso-Diaz 02 – Matias Travieso-Diaz is a lawyer who has been involved in a variety of business transactions abroad, particularly in Latin America. He has led various projects in the region, including the privatization of the state-owned telecommunications company of a Central American country and the privatization via concession of the international airports of two countries. He has been following closely events in Cuba for a number of years, and since 1991 has headed the Cuban Project, a Pillsbury interdisciplinary effort designed to assess the legal and business issues that will arise when Cuba moves to a free-market economy. He has published extensively on Cuban issues and has organized and participated in numerous conferences on topics relevant to Cuba’s transition to a free-market democracy. (“Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Expropriated U.S. Property in Post-Castro Cuba”, ASCE 2002, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume12/pdfs/travieso2.pdf)

The paper assumes that resolution of the U.S. claims issue will not be practicable while the current socialist regime is in power in Cuba. While Cuban officials have periodically expressed a willingness to discuss settlement of the claims issue with the United States,2 such willingness is usually expressed in the context of setting off those claims against Cuba’s alleged right to recover hundreds of billions of dollars in damages from the United States due to the U.S. trade embargo and other acts of aggression against Cuba.3 To date, the Cuban government has given no indication that it is prepared to negotiate in good faith and without preconditions a potential settlement of the U.S. expropriation claims with this country.

#### Cuba says no—they like the embargo

**French 13** – editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note. She has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba. Landau French has published on U.S.-Cuban relations and Cuban affairs for more than a decade (Anya, “Secretary Kerry: Will He or Won't He Take On Cuba?” 2/10, The Havana Note, http://thehavananote.com/2013/02/secretary\_kerry\_will\_he\_or\_wont\_he\_take\_cuba)

And, then there’s the Cuban government. As much as many in the Cuban government (particularly the diplomatic corps) want to reduce tensions with the United States and finally make real progress on long-standing grievances held by both sides, they aren’t desperate for the big thaw. Many U.S. analysts, including in government, speculate that this is because Cuba’s leaders don’t really want to change the relationship, that strife serves their needs better than would the alternative. That could be so, but there’s also a hefty amount of skepticism and pride on the Cuban side, as well. After so many decades and layers of what Cuba calls the U.S. blockade, Cubans are unwilling to have the terms of any ‘surrender’ dictated to them. In fact, they are bound and determined that there will be no surrender. They would argue, what is there to surrender but their government’s very existence, something the leadership obviously isn’t going to put on the table. Many in the Cuban government question whether the U.S. would offer anything that truly matters to Cuba, or honor any commitments made. Arguably, the last deal the U.S. made good on was struck during the Missile Crisis of October 1963, and Cuba wasn’t even at the table for that. It’s a lesser known fact that the United States never fully implemented the 1994/1995 migration accords, which committed both nations to work to prevent migration by irregular means. The U.S. did stop accepting illegal migrants from Cuba found at sea, but it still accepts them when they reach our shores – thus dubbed our ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy. And with our generous adjustment policy offering a green card after one year, the incentive to make the illegal trip remains largely in place.

#### Cuba will use the condition to veto the plan

**Ratliff 09 –** Research Fellow at the Independent Institute and a member of the Board of Advisors of the Institute’s Center on Global Prosperity. He is also a Research Fellow and Curator of the Americas Collection at the Hoover Institution(William, “Why and How to Lift the U.S. Embargo on Cuba”, 5/7, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2496)

How has the embargo failed? It has not brought down the Castro brothers, advanced democracy, freedom, human rights or prosperity in Cuba, or gotten compensation for Americans whose assets Cuba seized decades ago. It largely denies Americans the freedom to travel to Cuba, or to trade freely and otherwise interact Cubans on the island. And in recent decades it has given Fidel the scapegoat he needs—us—to excuse his economic utopianism and brutality. Supporters of the embargo see it as an expression of America’s moral indignation at Castro’s brutal policies. By limiting the flow of dollars to Cuba we deny some funds to Cuban security forces, as they argue, but we simultaneously withhold support for the daily lives of the Cuban people. For twenty years the embargo placated the very noisy Cuban American community in Florida, but by late 2008 even a majority of Cuban Americans, according to a Florida International University poll, had turned against it. It isn’t that Cuban Americans are going soft on Fidel, but that a majority finally see or admit that this policy is more harmful than positive to its own interests. And it is harmful to U.S. interests as well, which ought to be our primary concern, alienating the Hemisphere and the world as a whole while having only negative impacts in Cuba. The Cuban American National Foundation, long the epicenter of anti-Castroism in the United States, recently admitted that for many years the embargo has been “little beyond posturing for domestic electoral purposes.” How can we best end this policy with a minimum of confrontation, frustration and delay? The only way we can keep full control of the process is by lifting it unilaterally. The State Department recently lauded the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia. “It has long been and remains the position of the United States that normalization should take place without preconditions,” State said. So why not between the United States and Cuba, where the pain of the past hardly equals that of Turkey and Armenia? Is Castro a brutal dictator? Sure, but his atrocities are hardly worse than those of Robert Mugabe, the thug who rules Zimbabwe, a country we recognize. The United States demands more concessions from Cuba for recognition than from any other country in history. In fact, the Helms Burton Act is blatantly imperialistic, in the spirit of the Platt Amendment to the Monroe Doctrine a century ago, which poisoned U.S. relations with Cuba for decades. Negotiations without preconditions, which Obama says he supports, are the next best though potentially deeply flawed approach. Informal discussions between U.S. and Cuban diplomats already are underway. If Cuban pragmatists, including President Raul Castro, can over-ride Fidel’s anti-American passions, perhaps the United States, if we are very flexible, and Cuba can work out a step-by-step, face-saving plan to reduce tensions and normalize relations. The Obama administration got off to a positive start by dropping the misguided 2004 Bush administration restrictions on remittances and travel to Cuba, but then in public statements fell immediately into the trap of previous administrations by demanding “reciprocity.” This seems a just and reasonable demand, but in the propaganda-filled public arena it is a game-stopper. In practical terms, the public demand for reciprocity hands Cuba a veto over U.S. policy, which it has used before to short-circuit emerging U.S. moderation. Cuba will never make tradeoffs on important matters so long as the core of the basically flawed embargo remains in place. Lifting the embargo would unleash a new dynamic and put full responsibility for Cuban rights violations and economic failure squarely on Cuba’s leaders where it belongs. We can hope, but can’t guarantee, that ending the embargo will encourage real domestic reforms in Cuba. We can guarantee that it will rid us of a demeaning, hypocritical and counterproductive policy.

### 2AC—USTR DA

#### Froman can’t solve without TPA—that won’t pass Congress—also thumps the DA

Palmer 13 – Doug Palmer is one of the most experienced trade reporters in Washington after nearly 15 years on the beat. Palmer's job currently includes keeping tabs on trade frictions with China and negotiations on two huge regional free regional trade agreements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. (“USTR Froman presses for trade bill 'as soon as possible'”, 10/24/2013, Politico, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/ustr-froman-presses-for-trade-bill-as-soon-as-possible-98797.html)

President Barack Obama was often criticized in his first term for moving too slowly on trade, but now his chief negotiator is pressing Congress to pick up the pace as the White House pushes to conclude a landmark trade deal in the Asia-Pacific by the end of the year.

“We think it would be good to get TPA [trade promotion authority] as soon as possible with as broad bipartisan support as possible,” U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman told POLITICO in an exclusive interview this week.

That legislation, also known as “fast track,” would allow Obama to submit trade agreements to Congress for straight up-and-down votes without any amendments, giving other countries confidence that any deal they reach with the White House wouldn’t be picked apart by U.S. lawmakers unhappy with one provision or another.

But there is little momentum in Congress toward passing the legislation.

Weeks of drama over Republican attempts to defund Obamacare and the resulting government shutdown also have kept trade off the congressional agenda, while Obama has identified the budget, farm bill and immigration legislation as his priorities for the rest of the year.

Congress last passed TPA legislation in 2002, clearing the way for the Republican administration of former President George W. Bush to negotiate trade deals with more than a dozen countries.

Obama waited until negotiations on the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement had been going for more than three years before formally asking Congress for the legislation.

Senate Republicans tried to pass the bill two years ago but were blocked by Senate Democrats who said the time was not yet right to take up the measure.

Now, Froman and his team at the office of the U.S. Trade Representative are pushing to finish the TPP talks by the end of the year, putting pressure on Congress to move a TPA bill to set the stage for the final phase of talks.

However, months of technical-level talks between Democratic and Republican staff on the committees of jurisdiction in Congress still have not produced a bill, even though both Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Mont.) and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp (R-Mich.) set a goal of passing TPA this year.

Some Republicans complain the White House is not doing enough to build support for legislation among congressional Democrats, a charge that Froman rejects.

“I’m up on the Hill for a significant portion of every week, meeting with Democrats and Republicans in the House and the Senate, in groups and individually, precisely on that issue. I think we are certainly carrying our share of the weight on this one,” Froman said.

#### WTO negotiations trigger the link

Palmer 13 – Doug Palmer is one of the most experienced trade reporters in Washington after nearly 15 years on the beat. Palmer's job currently includes keeping tabs on trade frictions with China and negotiations on two huge regional free regional trade agreements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. (“USTR Froman presses for trade bill 'as soon as possible'”, 10/24/2013, Politico, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/ustr-froman-presses-for-trade-bill-as-soon-as-possible-98797.html)

Meanwhile, Froman will return to Bali in early December for a meeting with top trade officials from the other 158 members of the World Trade Organization. That has prompted speculation TPP trade ministers could meet on the sidelines of the WTO ministerial to try to close the TPP deal. But Froman declined to give odds for that.

“It’s possible that ministers will get together again between now and the end of the year, but we haven’t made any firm decisions as to when and where that might take place,” he said.

The United States’ main focus at the December meeting is on a possible “trade facilitation” deal among all 159 WTO members, aimed at making it easier to move goods across borders by reducing red tape and regulation, along with other components on agriculture and development as part of a final Bali package, he said.

Froman praised new WTO Director General Roberto Azevedo for “energizing” negotiations at WTO headquarters in Geneva but expressed concern a deal might not be reached.

“We are increasingly worried that not enough progress is being made [in the negotiations] and the pace isn’t sufficient to ensure that there is a completed, strong, binding trade facilitation agreement by the time of Bali, and that has to be part of the core Bali package,” Froman said.

Azevedo has cast the Bali meeting as a watershed moment for the WTO, whose full membership has not agreed on any trade liberalizing package since it was created nearly 20 years ago.

#### Broader shift toward Asia solves the impact

DuPont 10/15 [Alan. Prof IR at the University of NSW and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Lowy Institute. “Pivot to Asia has Not Fallen Off its Axis” *The Australian*, 10/15/13 ln//GBS-JV]

Contrary to recent commentary, the US will stay the course on Obama's pivot to Asia for the simple reason that Asia engages US vital interests more than any other region, including the Middle East.¶ By 2050, 40 million Americans are likely to regard themselves as Asian and they are growing faster than any other ethnic group, including Hispanics.¶ Over time, this demographic dynamic will drive a new era of closer, more intense people-to-people ties with Asia, stimulating trade and investment.¶ As economic and financial power continues its inexorable shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, US strategic interests will be increasingly engaged.¶ Despite the unseemly bickering in Washington that prevented Obama from attending APEC and the East Asia Summit, the US has hardly neglected Asia over the past decade, economically or militarily. The much maligned Trans-Pacific Partnership is a major trade initiative that may yet achieve Obama's vision of a US-led, liberal trade arrangement, and the US still maintains 100,000 troops and enormous firepower in the region.¶ This month, US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel announced a significant agreement with his Japanese counterpart to base in Japan, for the first time, sophisticated Global Hawk drones, radar and aircraft, including the first deployment outside the US of the Joint Strike Fighter, destined to become the core of Australia's own air force in a few years.¶ This is a significant and under-recognised down payment on the pivot which President Obama has promised to quarantine from future budget cuts.¶ The take away for Australia is that the US is far from a busted flush in Asia, and a renaissance may be closer than pessimists think.

#### No impact to the economy

Drezner 12 – Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder.

The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40

None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

### 2AC—Farm Bill DA

#### Won’t pass—differences over SNAP

Wang 11/18 – Robert is a staffer for CantonRep.com. (“Congress could cut food-stamp assistance further”, 11/18/2013, http://www.cantonrep.com/article/20131117/NEWS/131119435/?tag=1)

On top of the cut this month in food stamp benefits, House Republicans are negotiating a new farm bill with Senate Democrats that could lead to further cuts to the food stamp program, The Associated Press has reported.

The program is officially the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or SNAP. Republicans who control the U.S. House want to cut about $3.9 billion a year for 10 years from the approximately $80 billion-a-year program, the AP says.

Much of the savings would come from modifying the formula used to calculate benefits and tightening eligibility requirements. More recipients would be subject to work requirements and time limits, making nearly 3 million people ineligible for benefits, the Congressional Budget Office said. About 850,000 households would lose an average of about $90 in benefits a month.

While the expiration of a provision in the 2009 Recovery Act that temporarily boosted benefits led to this month's cut in food stamp benefits, U.S. Rep. Jim Renacci, R-Wadsworth, said in a statement he believes the law was a "failed" policy of President Barack Obama that resulted in a weak economy and one of seven Americans being on food stamps.

Renacci said the only across-the-board reduction in food stamp benefits in the House Republican bill is a result of the expiration of increases in benefits averaging more than 15 percent under the 2009 law. He said the bill restores work requirements, eradicates rampant fraud and prevents "undocumented immigrants, major lottery winners, certain criminals and traditional college students" along with dead people from getting food stamp benefits.

"It will ensure that the benefits within the safety net program will be available to those who need them most," Renacci's statement said.

In a statement, U.S. Rep. Bob Gibbs, R-Lakeville, said eligible recipients who need the help will continue to get it.

"The reforms offered through the Farm Bill would not change the current qualifications for most Americans," he said in a statement. "This program should be for those who qualify and are in need of this assistance not those who are out to cheat the system."

DEMOCRATS' VIEW

U.S. Rep. Tim Ryan, D-Warren, who represents Alliance, called cuts to the food stamp program "some of the most cruel, insensitive cuts I've seen in my time in Congress."

He said local unemployment and the poverty rate are still higher than they were before the recession and the time to consider cuts to food stamps is after the economy fully recovers.

"Many of these people are children. Many of these people are seniors," he said.

Ryan added that the cuts further restrict the poor's access to costly, more nutritious food. He predicts many recipients will develop conditions like diabetes, incurring higher costs for Medicaid and Medicare.

He said he favors work requirements that recipients can reasonably fulfill and programs that reduce people's dependence on government assistance by helping them get employment through retraining and education. But the poor "want a little bit of food for their kids while they're looking for work or getting retrained," Ryan said.

In a statement, U.S. Sen. Sherrod Brown, D-Avon, said, "This reduction in SNAP will harm everyone, including children, seniors, those with disabilities, working parents, and veterans. That is why it's essential that the House work with my fellow Senate conferees to pass a farm bill that would protect SNAP and its safeguards for our country's most vulnerable citizens."

#### PC’s bad—increases opposition

**Klein 12**, Ezra, a columnist at the Washington Post, as well as a contributor to MSNBC and Bloomberg, editor of Wonkblog. Citing Frances Lee, a professor at the University of Maryland, at Texas A. & M. University [“The Unpersuaded: Who listens to a President?” <http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/03/19/120319fa_fact_klein?currentPage=all>] HURWITZ

The experience helped to crystallize something that Lee had been thinking about. “Most of the work on the relationship between the President and Congress was about the President as the agenda setter,” she says. “I was coming at it from the perspective of the increase in partisanship, and so I looked at Presidents not as legislative leaders but as party leaders.” That changes things dramatically. As Lee writes in her book “Beyond Ideology” (2009), there are “inherent zero-sum conflicts between the two parties’ political interests as they seek to win elections.” Put more simply, the President’s party can’t win unless the other party loses. And both parties know it. This, Lee decided, is the true nature of our political system. To test her theory, she created a database of eighty-six hundred Senate votes between 1981 and 2004. She found that a President’s powers of persuasion were strong, but only within his own party. **Nearly four thousand** of the **votes** were of the mission-to-Mars variety—they **should have found support among both Democrats and Republicans. Absent a President’s involvement, these votes fell along party lines just a third of the time, but when a President took a stand that number rose to more than half**. The same thing happened with votes on more partisan issues, such as bills that raised taxes; they typically split along party lines, but when a President intervened the divide was even sharper. One way of interpreting this is that party members let their opinion of the President influence their evaluation of the issues. That’s not entirely unreasonable. A Democrat might have supported an intervention in Iraq but questioned George W. Bush’s ability to manage it effectively. Another interpretation is that party members let their political incentives influence how they evaluate policy. “Whatever people think about raw policy issues, they’re aware that Presidential successes will help the President’s party and hurt the opposing party,” Lee says. “It’s not to say they’re entirely cynical, but the fact that success is useful to the President’s party is going to have an effect on how members respond.” Or, to paraphrase Upton Sinclair, it’s difficult to get a man to support something if his reëlection depends on his not supporting it.

#### PC isn’t quantifiable—means zero risk of a DA

Hirsh 13 – Michael, chief correspondent for National Journal; citing Ornstein, a political scientist and scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and Bensel, gov’t prof at Cornell. ("There's No Such Thing as Political Capital", 2/7/2013, [www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207](http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207))

But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote.¶ Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”

#### Budget fight’s inevitable and *time pressure* forces it to the top of the docket

Alberta 11/25 [Timothy. Politics for the National Journal. “Congressional Vacation Set to Create Another Fiscal Crisis” 11/25/13 <http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/congressional-vacation-set-to-create-another-fiscal-crisis-20131125> //GBS-JV]

Congress will soon be forced to debate yet another short-term, stopgap bill to keep the government open, not because a budget deal can't be reached, but because lawmakers haven't left enough time to reach one.¶ The House and Senate have already left town for Thanksgiving. And once they return, both chambers are in session concurrently for just four days—Dec. 10 through Dec. 13—before Congress adjourns again for the holiday recess.¶ Simply put, there won't be enough time for budget negotiators to solidify the details of an agreement that sets spending levels for the rest of fiscal 2014 and fiscal 2015 – much less sell it to their respective caucuses – before a Dec. 13 deadline.¶ But that's not the only deadline being threatened by Congress's vacation schedule. Funding for the federal government expires Jan. 15. So if House Budget Chairman Paul Ryan, R-Wis., and Senate Budget Chairwoman Patty Murray, D-Wash., fail, as expected, to reach agreement by Dec. 13, lawmakers will return to Washington the week of Jan. 6 staring down another government shutdown, with only about a week to do something about it.¶ All told, the two chambers of Congress have scheduled just 10 days in session together between Nov. 22 and Jan. 15, out of a possible 51 days, not counting Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year's Day.

#### Speculation and financial deregulation make the impact inevitable

Chandrasekhar 12 – C.P. is a professor at the Center for Economic Studies and Planning at Jawaharlal Nehru University. (“Addressing the global food crisis: Causes, implications and policy options”, March 2012, <http://www.augurproject.eu/IMG/pdf/Global_food_markets_GhoshChandrasekhar_March2012.pdf>)

Despite all these factors, it is clear that the recent volatility in world trade prices of important food items simply cannot be explained by real demand and supply factors. The extent of price variation in such a short time already suggests that such movements could not have been created by supply and demand, especially as in world trade the effects of seasonality in a particular region are countered by supplies from other regions. In any case, FAO data show very clearly that there was scarcely any change in global supply and utilisation over this period, and that if anything, output changes were more than sufficient to meet changes in utilisation in the period of rising prices, while supply did not greatly outstrip demand in the period of falling prices3. Instead, it can be plausibly argued that financial speculation – and specifically, investor activity in unregulated (OTC) commodity futures – was the major factor behind the sharp price rise of many primary commodities, including agricultural items over the past year (UNCTAD, 2009; IATP, 2008 and 2009; Wahl, 2009; Robles, Torrero and von Braun, 2009; World Development Movement, 2010; UN Special Rapporteur, 2010; Gilbert, 2010). Even recent research from the World Bank (Bafis and Haniotis, 2010) recognises the role played by the “financialisation of commodities” in the price surges and declines, and notes that price variability has overwhelmed price trends for important commodities. Futures markets for food, oil and other commodities have long been used by farmers and others to maintain stability in their business operations and plan for the future. Commercial traders would purchase food commodities from farmers for future delivery at a fixed price. This would relieve the farmers of any risks associated with future fluctuations in the prices of the food commodities they were growing. As with any insurance-type arrangement, the commercial traders would be assuming the farmers’ risk for a fee. They would earn their fee no matter what happened to food prices over time. But the traders would also be speculating that they could profit from changes in future market prices. Financial deregulation in the early part of the current decade gave a major boost to the entry of new financial players into the commodity exchanges. In the US, which has the greatest volume and turnover of both spot and future commodity trading, the significant regulatory transformation occurred in 2000. While commodity futures contracts existed before, they were traded only on regulated exchanges under the control of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which required traders to disclose their holdings of each commodity and stick to specified position limits, so as to prevent market manipulation. Therefore they were dominated by commercial players who were using it for the reasons mentioned above, rather than for mainly speculative purposes. In 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act effectively deregulated commodity trading in the United States, by exempting over-the-counter (OTC) commodity trading (outside of regulated exchanges) from CFTC oversight. Soon after this, several unregulated commodity exchanges opened. These allowed any and all investors, including hedge funds, pension funds and investment banks, to trade commodity futures contracts without any position limits, disclosure requirements, or regulatory oversight. The value of such unregulated trading zoomed to reach around $9 trillion at the end of 2007, which was estimated to be more than twice the value of the commodity contracts on the regulated exchanges. According to the Bank for International Settlements, the value of outstanding amounts of OTC commodity-linked derivatives for commodities other than gold and precious metals increased from $5.85 trillion in June 2006 to $7.05 trillion in June 2007 to as much as $12.39 trillion in June 2008 (BIS 2009). Unlike producers and consumers who use such markets for hedging purposes, financial firms and other speculators increasingly entered the market in order to profit from short-term changes in price. They were aided by the “swap-dealer loophole” in the 2000 legislation, which allowed traders to use swap agreements to take long-term positions in commodity indexes. There was a consequent emergence of commodity index funds that were essentially “index traders” who focus on returns from changes in the index of a commodity, by periodically rolling over commodity futures contracts prior to their maturity date and reinvesting the proceeds in new contracts. Such commodity funds dealt only in forward positions with no physical ownership of the commodities involved. This further aggravated the treatment of these markets as vehicles for a diversified portfolio of commodities (including not only food but also raw materials and energy) as an asset class, rather than as mechanisms for managing the risk of actual producers and consumers.. Overall, the number of derivatives contracts increased more than six-fold between 2002 and mid-2008, as these investment vehicles became a safe haven from the subprime crisis and financial meltdown. It has been estimated that index fund purchases from 2003-7 already were higher than the futures market purchases of physical hedgers and traditional speculators combined, and then doubled in the first half of 2008. The trend movements in food prices underwent a structural shift at the same time as index traders began dominating the commodities futures markets for food. Thus, between 1975-76 and 2000-01, world food prices declined by 53 percent in real US dollar terms. However, since 2000-01, this trend has been reversed. Between January 2002 and June 2008, the global food index rose by 133 percent. The rapid price increases were led by grains in 2005, despite a record global crop yield in 2004-05. Between January 2005 and June 2008, maize prices tripled, wheat rose by 127 percent, and rice rose 170 percent. A 2009 study by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reports that “the price boom between 2002 and mid-2008 was the most pronounced in several decades — in magnitude, duration and depth.” (UNCTAD, 2009, p. 72. After the dramatic rise – especially in the period June 2007 to June 2008, when the global food price index nearly doubled – global commodity prices then collapsed almost equally sharply, such that by December 2008 they were back to their levels of the previous year. Obviously, such large swings in commodity (and especially food) prices cannot be explained by changes in real demand and supply, especially as FAO data indicate that aggregate global supply and utilisation changed very little over this period. Food prices started rising again in early 2009, though at a slower rate. However, in the second half of 2010 they have once again been rising rapidly. By December 2010, the index was 136 per cent higher than in January 2002. In the second half of 2010, food prices rose sharply, nearly doubling in the case of wheat and increasing by more than 60 per cent in the case of maize. Similar trends were evident in the petroleum market, which has driven oil prices up to around $100 a barrel. Higher oil prices also fed into higher food prices, creating another source of price spiral. It is likely that the movement of the index funds has also been driven by the price of oil, itself a highly speculative market with some 70% of futures investments coming from non-commercial speculators. This possibility is indeed embedded in the structure of global oil markets, as noted in Roncaglia (2003). Under such institutionalized structures, the price of oil drives the movement of the index funds and pushes up the prices of food and other agricultural commodities, regardless of the real supply and demand of such commodities. Similarly, it is likely that a combination of panic buying and speculative financial activity is once again playing a role in driving world food prices up well beyond anything that is warranted by real quantity movements. Data on financial activity in commodity futures markets from the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission suggest that until the end of December the net long positions of index investors had increased dramatically in commodities like wheat and corn. This explains to some extent the dramatic increase (doubling) in the price of wheat in the period June-December 2010, a period when actual global wheat production slightly increased and demand (as expressed in the FAO’s measure of “utilisation”) was roughly unchanged.

## 1AR

### Japanese relations

#### Relations resilient

**Green 11** – Michael is an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University and senior advisor and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies ("The Democratic Party of Japan and the Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance" The Journal of Japanese Studies, Volume 27, Number 1, Winter 2011, Project MUSE)

Despite the travails and uncertainty now clouding the alliance, there are multiple reasons to expect that Japan will continue to be closely aligned with the United States and influential in the international system. First, there is historical precedent. As Kenneth Pyle has pointed out, Japan has always successfully reordered its domestic institutions and instruments of national power in the face of new international challenges even if institutions in Japan's conservative political culture have a sticky resistance to change, as Carol Gluck has observed.10 Postwar history also demonstrates the resilience of U.S.-Japan security relations. The fact is that the alliance has entered periods of drift and faced crises before, including the 1960 Anpo demonstrations, the protests against the Vietnam War, the "Nixon shocks," the FS-X confrontation, and the 1995 Okinawa rape incident. In each case, observers predicted the end of the alliance, yet in each case the security relationship emerged significantly strengthened. Kent Calder has described a pattern in Japanese domestic politics in which the conservative LDP elite would co-opt the opposition's policy initiatives in response to social or economic crises, thus reinforcing the social contract and legitimacy of conservative rule.11 In similar ways, the United States and Japan have repeatedly responded to bilateral political crises by offering new reciprocal "compensation" in terms of expanded Japanese security responsibilities and a reduction of the U.S. military footprint in Japan.12 This continual process of redefining and reaffirming the 1960 security treaty is not always visible in the midst of a crisis, but it is one reason why support for the alliance has steadily expanded in both the United States and Japan over its 50-year history. In addition to historical precedent, structural factors will bind if not ultimately define Japan's strategic options. The rise of Chinese power and North Korean nuclear brinkmanship render a close alliance with the United States by far the best guarantor of Japanese security, while growing economic [End Page 94] interdependence with China will ensure that Japanese governments (and U.S. governments, for that matter) will resist crude strategies of containment against China. Japan's demographic and fiscal challenges are already limiting the DPJ's original promises of largess (cutting highway fees, distributing child allowances, etc.) and forcing a consensus within the party that the policy tool kit will have to include some combination of cutting corporate taxes, raising the consumption tax, and restricting spending. If these seemed like uniquely difficult choices for Japan at one point, it is only necessary to observe the enormous changes Europe must now make in its social contract in order to remain fiscally solvent—or to consider the massive demographic challenge looming in the decade ahead in China as a result of the one child policy and a massively deficient social welfare net. Exaggerating the uniqueness and irreversibility of Japanese challenges today makes no more sense than predicting Japan's certain global domination did 20 years ago.

### TPA

#### It’s key and not going to pass

Lowery 11/12 – Annie is a writer for the NYT. (“House Stalls Trade Pact Momentum”, 11/12/2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/business/international/house-stalls-trade-pact-momentum.html?\_r=0)

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration is rushing to reach a new deal intended to lower barriers to trade with a dozen Pacific Rim nations, including Japan and Canada, before the end of the year. But the White House is now facing new hurdles closer to home, with nearly half of the members of the House signing letters or otherwise signaling their opposition to granting so-called fast-track authority that would make any agreement immune to a Senate filibuster and not subject to amendment. No major trade pact has been approved by Congress in recent decades without such authority. Two new House letters with about 170 signatories in total — the latest and strongest iteration of long-simmering opposition to fast-track authority and to the trade deal more broadly — have been disclosed just a week before international negotiators are to meet in Salt Lake City for another round of talks. “Some of us have opposed past trade deals and some have supported them, but when it comes to fast track, members of Congress from across the political spectrum are united,” said Representative Walter B. Jones Jr. of North Carolina, who circulated the Republican letter. Without fast-track authority, however, the other countries in the negotiations might balk at American requests since they wouldn’t be sure the final deal would remain unchanged. And getting both houses of Congress to agree to the final deal might be close to impossible without the fast-track authority, which the Obama administration has requested and which is being pursued in the Senate by Max Baucus, Democrat of Montana and the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, along with the top Republican on the committee, Orrin G. Hatch of Utah. “This could be the end of T.P.P.,” said Lori Wallach of Public Citizen, a watchdog group that has opposed the deal, formally called the Trans-Pacific Partnership. “All these other countries are like, ‘Wait, you have no trade authority and nothing you’ve promised us means anything? Why would we give you our best deal?’ Why would you be making concessions to the emperor who has no clothes?” Michael B. Froman, the United States trade representative, said that he continued to work with Congress on fast-track authority, also known as trade promotion authority. “We believe that Congress should have a strong role in determining U.S. trade policy — and one of the best ways they can do that is to pass a law codifying their direction to the administration for negotiating trade agreements,” Mr. Froman said. “We will continue to consult with Congress on the importance of T.P.A. as a longstanding tool for shaping U.S. trade policy on behalf of the American people.” The Obama administration has conducted a behind-the-scenes campaign to win over congressional offices and keep members — in particular, key committee members — informed. “Everything we do with trade policy is done hand-in-glove with Congress,” Mr. Froman said in recent remarks, where he also emphasized that there was no trade agreement yet, and that the administration continued to get feedback from Congress about what to include in the deal. But coming to an agreement at home might be as much of a hurdle as doing so internationaly. Senate aides said that the overloaded congressional calendar posed a challenge to passing fast-track authority by the end of the year, but that they thought it still had enough bipartisan support to win passage in the Senate. “The legislative window is closing,” said Sean Neary, a spokesman for Senator Baucus. “This is a priority.” The greater challenge lies in the House, where opposition to the fast-track authority comes from both policy and process concerns, and from a range of liberals, conservatives and moderates. Many members have had a longstanding opposition to certain elements of the deal, arguing it might hurt American workers and disadvantage some American businesses. Those concerns are diverse, including worries about food safety, intellectual property, privacy and the health of the domestic auto industry. Others say that they are upset that the Obama administration has, in their view, kept Congress in the dark about the negotiations, by not allowing congressional aides to observe the negotiations and declining to make certain full texts available. “We remain deeply troubled by the continued lack of adequate congressional consultation in many areas of the proposed pact that deeply implicate Congress’ constitutional and domestic policy authorities,” said the House Democrats’ letter, circulated by Representative Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut and George Miller of California.